The New
REPUBLIC
A Journal of Opinion

VOLUME XX | New York, Wednesday, November 12, 1919 | Number 258

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The Week

AS we go to press there seems reason for believing that the demands of the coal-miners for a wage more in keeping with the cost of living may be satisfied, in part measure at least, without a long and exhaustive struggle as preliminary. Both operators and miners say they are ready to reopen negotiations—though only the readiness of the miners is hailed by the press as a confession of "weakness." The one most discouraging factor in the situation is the Attorney-General's statement, in a telegram to one of the miner's locals, that the government "has not taken sides either for or against the mine owners or the mine workers." That is true only as a legal quibble. The injunction did nothing to the mine owners—and attempted to take away from the workers what had proved to be their one instrument of getting a hearing. The administration, taking its cue from Mr. Wilson's first statement, has technically and officially ignored "the merits" in the case. It is the prerequisite of an early settlement and a fair one that it cease to ignore them.

ELECTION day brought an unexpectedly large Socialist vote in New York, and the defeat of Tammany; but chief interest throughout the country doubtless centered in the contest for the Governorship of Massachusetts. There ex-Governor Coolidge has won an easy victory over Mr. Long—in a contest of which many newspapers declared "Americanism" to be the issue. Among Mr. Long's supporters, declares a correspondent of the New York Times, were "all the Bolsheviki, the Soviet, the I. W. W. . . . . the striking policemen and all their disorderly followers, the Huns, the Finns, the Scandinavians, and the Greeks who are followers of Venizelos." Mr. Long was nevertheless the loser. But it is hard to believe that his defeat is a clear triumph for law and order—and not a triumph of one man's interpretation of law and order as against another's. The issue of the election, as we understand it, was not support of the police strike, but reinstatement of those strikers whose grievances were confessed to be legitimate when members of the new police force were granted terms which members of the old force had demanded. On this score the Times' correspondent (one among many) declared Mr. Long's "Sovietism" to be "as frank and open as that of Lenine and Trotzky."

IT is a duty of those who warn labor against "direct action" to justify their faith that the orderly process of law will work to give each plaintiff a fair hearing. In the performance of this duty the state and many of the municipal authorities of Pennsylvania have failed miserably. Case upon case of plain suppression of the rights of free speech and assembly have been established by affidavit. Often there is an unfortunate link in sympathy between municipal authorities and the steel companies. In Bethlehem, for instance, where meetings have been prohibited—and even picketing forbidden—the mayor is also vice-president of the Bethlehem Steel Company. For fair treatment in Bethlehem, and in other cities of the steel valley, the trade union leaders have appealed successively—and in vain—to municipal authorities, to the Government, and to the Congress of the United States.

IN these circumstances the trade unionists of Pennsylvania have again sent a message to the Governor of the State and to the Attorney-General in Washington. They ask that by the most constitutional of methods—by the convocation of a special session of the state legislature—their grievances be investigated and their "lawful, reasonable and constitutional demands" complied with. Failing to win this redress they can only assume, states their message, that legal protection will continue to be denied them; they accordingly instruct their executive council "to issue a call

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for a state-wide strike when, in its judgment, it is necessary to compel respect for law and the restoration of liberty as guaranteed by the Constitution of the United States and of the State of Pennsylvania."

DESPITE the collapse of the first Industrial Conference it has been determined that there shall be a second one. The Cabinet has recommended that no more than fifteen members be appointed—and the newspapers announce that all who are chosen will be "truly representative of the public." In the search for an industrial peace, conferences seem to have first call over Congress. One might imagine that if any body of men were "truly representative of the public" it would be that body elected as representatives by popular ballot. But no one counts on Congress. It lacks the representation of those different economic interests which an Industrial Conference can call together. Congress draws its membership from two useless parties, split, for the most part, on unreal issues; and at a time when more genuine differences need representation it is almost forgotten.

LABOR, as well as the public, is to have a new Conference. Mr. Gompers has summoned the executives of the national and international unions, and invited representatives of the farmers to join the council. Obvious difficulties stand in the way of co-operation between farmers and trade unionists. If only the stoutly conservative organizations such as the Farmers National Congress attend the session (this Congress went on record last week as opposed to "all strikes") the proposed partnership will not get very far. But other organizations, such as the Nonpartisan League and some of the co-operatives, are working toward a system of food distribution that will benefit the consumer as well as the farmer. With such aims the trade unionists must sooner or later align their movement, if they wish to serve a genuine public interest.

AMERICANS cannot read with much satisfaction the reports which have been submitted as a working basis for the International Labor Conference in Washington. Sixteen countries are listed as having eight-hour laws which apply to most industrial establishments. From that list we are missing. Twenty-one nations make special regulation for the employment of mothers before and after childbirth. From this list we are also missing. Finally, nearly every industrial country forbids the employment in factories of children under fourteen. Here again we are missing—this time along with Rumania, India and Spain. Statesmen who want to Americanize, and who have not got beyond the stage of negative decision, could study these different reports with profit.

THREE months ago the federal Administration set out to reduce the cost of living. Its efforts, say headlines in many of the papers, are now beginning to show results. The retail cost of twenty-two staple foods is estimated by the Bureau of Labor Statistics to have gone down two per cent in September as compared with August. To be sure, the cost of nineteen other staple foods went *up*. And in the latter class are included those three essential products: milk, butter and eggs. Still, cabbages went down 8 per cent, and onions 17. If you can forget that flour is still 121 per cent above pre-war levels, and potatoes 126, it is easy to be convinced that when a labor union asks for wages enough to buy flour and potatoes it is aiming at something entirely too high.

THE Senate Committee on Interstate Commerce has declined to reopen hearings on its railway bill, and is proceeding with a measure that may bring two controversies to a head. One will be the result of anti-strike provisions carried in the bill; the other, less immediate, will center upon methods of valuation—for the Committee proposes to base freight and passenger rates on the value of railway property. In the House of Representatives a different sort of measure is being framed. It contains no anti-strike clause, and no provision to guarantee the roads a fixed income. Framers of this latter bill do not suggest how some of the less solvent roads are to be kept going. Neither branch of Congress has yet fully measured the three factors essential to a solution of railway problems: income, unification and a satisfied staff of employees.

CABLE dispatches from Helsingfors had General Yudenitch inside the walls of Petrograd on four different occasions; but it appears, now, that the attacking army is farther away than it was two weeks ago. Capture of Petrograd might have had a moral value for the anti-Bolshevik forces; but it was in the South that the real offensive was under way. Orel is a railway center, two hundred and forty miles from Moscow, the point of a salient in Denikin's line. Three times, in a little more than a week, the city has changed hands. What handicaps Denikin most is apparently an inability to hold the land over which he marches. There are revolts behind his line, and on one flank the Ukrainians, charging Denikin with atrocities, have turned against him.

DENIKIN, however, has no more trouble behind his line than Kolchak has in Siberia. All along it has been difficult for Kolchak to deal with various chieftains who chose to rule their own districts in their own manner. Recently there has been added a new difficulty for the Supreme Ruler. Ivan Yakusheff, deposed President of that first Siberian Duma which Kolchak dispersed in the interests of democracy, has called for the overthrow of the Kolchak government and the convocation of a new assembly. His proclamation declares that "as a result of Admiral Kolchak's dictatorship not a trace is left of the enthusiasm with which the population welcomed the fall of Soviet power in Siberia."

BOTH Kolchak and Denikin are apparently to be cut off from the source of their most substantial support. This support has been coming from the British Exchequer rather than from the Russian people. A government statement

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in Parliament now announces that Great Britain is no longer supplying funds or supplies to Kolchak and does not contemplate supplying Denikin indefinitely. "We are approaching the end of our entanglements in Russia," declares Mr. Winston Churchill. An end to those entanglements is long overdue. The British government has gambled away perhaps a billion dollars in its Russian adventures, and a great many lives—principally Russian lives. Because the country's finances will stand no more gambling, the government is now about to pull out of Russia—relying only upon the blockade and native anti-Bolshevik enthusiasm.

AMERICA'S part in the Russian blockade is to be a cautions one. Lloyd George once informed the Council of Ten that the systematic starving of Russia was a policy to be considered by "no humane people." Mr. George has got away from that theory; but it seems still to trouble our own delegates in Paris. They are determined that the United States shall not participate actively in the blockade. We simply shall not object to what our Allies do, and we shall help a bit by agreeing not to grant clearance papers to ships sailing for Soviet Russia. Thus we preserve a certain virtue without sacrificing our effectiveness. Whether Germany can be brought into line without the use of force seems now to be uncertain. One of the first pronouncements of the young League of Nations may have to be the threat to starve Germany until she is at length willing to starve Russia.

IT could have been no great surprise to Captain d'Annunzio that he won the elections in Fiume. His precautions were painstaking. First he provided that there should be but one ticket (his own). Then he ruled that on this ticket no one but annexationists should appear. And finally he closed the bridge between Fiume and Sussak to keep the Jugoslavs from coming to the polls. These measures were entirely successful. The resultant victory, however, does not seem to be saving d'Annunzio from a growing hostility within his own camp. Frequent riots are reported in Fiume, and a good part of the business interests are going over to the moderates, led by Professor Zanella, now that they have discovered it is they who must pay the bill for d'Annunzio's visit.

IT would have been setting a low value on the moral power of the waning Peace Conference to have guessed, when the Rumanian army first marched into Budapest, that there it would be, thirteen weeks later, despite threats, pleas, bribes and commands. Rumanian occupation has exhibited every phase of terror and banditry. The stage of intelligent looting is long past. What remains is little more than savagery. Property is destroyed (telephone exchanges, for instance) apparently when the only gain is joy of deliberate destruction. Lines of bewildered Hungarian workmen are marched off into slavery. If the diplomats in Paris hope for the formation of a decent government under these conditions, or for honest elections, they will be mistaken. What can the signing of a "peace treaty" do for H· ·ary today?

RUMANIA'S defiance of the Peace Conference has not been limited to her occupation of Budapest. She now announces the annexation of Bessarabia. Since the armistice Rumanian troops have occupied this province, and Rumania has worked hard to get it allotted to her. Delegates of the Bessarabian people have protested. They have objected to Rumanian tyranny and demanded independence. The Peace Conference favored a plesbiscite. But that solution was too risky to have any charm for the Rumanians. There was a shorter road—and they took it. After all, why not? The Peace Conference had let them hold on in Budapest for thirteen months.

IT is hard to tell at just what point the Allied Supreme Command began to disapprove of the presence of von der Goltz and a German army in the Baltic provinces. Von der Goltz did not invade the provinces. The armistice terms required his army to stay there—and until recently that army was practically under the orders of Marshal Foch, the left wing of the famous anti-Bolshevik "cordon sanitaire." So long as von der Goltz remained passive there was no objection to his occupation of the provinces. But when he began an offensive he confronted the Supreme Command with a dilemma. Either the anti-Bolshevik Russians would accept von der Goltz as their leader; or he must be stopped—and stopping him might permit the diversion of additional Soviet troops to the southern battle-line.

Americanism in the Present Crisis

THE American nation confronts one of the most serious crises in its history. The industrial wage-earners upon whom it depends for the manning of its machinery of production are actively and profoundly discontented. They are making demands upon their employers for considerable increases of wages, for an eight hour day or less, for improved working conditions and for the recognition of their unions. There is nothing unprecedented or subversive about such demands. What is unprecedented in American labor controversies and what many employers consider to be subversive is the impatient and insistent spirit in which they are presented and enforced, the flood of prolonged, often unauthorized and frequently embittered strikes, the checking of production at a time when the welfare of society sorely needs a larger volume of commodities and the increasing interest of the wage-earners in programs of radical reconstruction. For these reasons the aggressive unrest of labor has provoked an even more aggressive and irreconcilable attitude on the part of its class opponents. There is a general disposition among the employers, the politicians and the press to treat the labor unrest as a culpable and sinister rebellion—as an autocratic anti-social demonstration of power which the Amer-

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ican nation in the interest of its own future prosperity and security must suppress at any cost. They cherish this bellicose and irreconcilable attitude of mind as patriotic and public spirited and as the veracious expression under the circumstances of the American national spirit.

We hope the opponents of labor will, while there is yet time and before they have done irretrievable damage, reconsider the pugnacity and the irreconcilability of the present attitude. They constitute the dominant, the more educated and the most articulate element in American public opinion. It is their privilege and their function to renew the American spirit in its application to one of the great transitional and critical periods in our national history. But their present temper and behaviour is not the expression of the binding, the healing and the re-adjusting element in the American national tradition. It will not in the long run contribute to the happiness of the American people or to the security of their social order. There are, unfortunately, two divergent aspects to that tradition. One is the spirit of the narrow self-righteous particularism in which the abolitionists in the North and the hotheads in the South dealt with the legal existence of slavery in America and which resulted in the Civil War. The other is the spirit which presided over the making of the Constitution and the subsequent appeasement of the radical agrarian democracy of that day and which Theodore Roosevelt and the Progressive party sought some years ago to revive for the treatment of contemporary social and industrial problems. The danger which the employers and their supporters in the press and among the politicians are now incurring is that of imitating the spirit of the abolitionists and the slave-owners and sowing the seeds of a calamitous and perhaps an irremediable class conflict on Amrican soil.

There are three salutary ingredients in the better American tradition which pugnacious Americans are in danger of ignoring and which, if ignored, will shatter the moral integrity of our national life. The first is the spirit of fair play and its blood-brother, free discussion, without which no democratic society can adjust its divergences of class interest and its drastic conflicts of opinion. The second is the willingness to limit in the interest of their just exercise the moral prestige and so far as necessary the legal authority of the government. The third is the democratic principle of government by consent of the governed and the recognition that it has an application to the realm of industry no less pertinent and necessary than its more familiar application to politics. The most conspicuous, active and responsible elements in American public opinion are violating the spirit of fair play; they are rendering free, patient and considerate discussion of public questions almost impossible. They are using violently and unscrupulously the control possessed by the majority over the organized authority of the nation for the purpose of overriding and subjugating a protesting minority. If they continue in their headstrong course, they will destroy the moral foundations of American democracy by the ultimate repudiation of government by consent.

They are violating the spirit of fair play, because they are wilfully prejudging every particular controversy as well as the whole wave of labor discontent as a culpable explosion of class aggression. They are trying to prevent labor from enjoying its day in the court of American public opinion. Their leaders are perfectly frank in private about the meaning and effect of their attitude and their motives in adopting it. They decline to discuss whether the demands of labor in any particular controversy are justifiable or unjustifiable. Like President Wilson in the case of the coal miners, they brush aside as irrelevant the merits of specific disputes. They only see the portentous and alarming fact that the wage-earners as a class are demanding a share in the control of American industry; and this partnership they have made up their minds to refuse and to associate with their refusal all the sanctions of social order and abstract justice. It was in this spirit of utter irreconcilability that they crushed the Boston police strike and punished vindictively the strikers without taking any account of the admitted grievances of their victims and the prolonged and abortive attempts of the policemen to obtain a redress of grievances without striking and without affiliating with organized labor. In the same spirit the management of the Steel Corporation refused in the name of celestial righteousness to confer with the representatives of its organized workers and were supported in this refusal by the press, the politicians and their own associates. In a no less intransigeant spirit the employing group in the Washington Conference rejected the principle of collective bargaining with the representatives of the unions. In this affair the unions had the support of the spokesmen of the "Public," but much good it did them. They were far more sharply criticized for quitting a Conference which has denied a principle essential to the mere existence of organized labor than the employers were for repudiating an equitable basis of future class cooperation. Finally when both parties to the coal controversy assumed similarly irreconcilable attitudes, public opinion condemned the miners as criminals and sustained the operators for persisting in a substantial refusal of all effective negotiation.

The employers and their supporters in the press defend and explain this behavior [illegible]peals to pop-

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ular passion and prejudice which are murderous of free and fair discussion. It is as profitable to argue with the great majority of American newspapers on a contemporary labor controversy as it is to argue with a brass band. They adopt the traditional tactics of a self-righteous majority and seek by every means to disqualify in advance their adversaries, the supporters of labor. Instead of keeping the discussion on a plane which permits of an ultimate adjustment when the facts are established and the principles which should in the public interest be considered binding on both parties, are accepted, they are ingenious and indefatigable in their effort to interpret the conflict as a fight to a finish, as a war of mutual extermination. They describe organized labor as an autocratic minority which insists on enforcing its autocratic will on the community and which all good citizens must condemn and oppose. They declare that the demands of labor raise a question of public safety which justified the intervention of the state and the use of its full sovereign power to subdue the insolent aggressor. They seek by innuendo and invective to identify the discontent of labor with a revolutionary conspiracy against public order. Instead of scrupulously discriminating between the orderly element in labor which is trying to better its conditions and win a share in the government of industry and the disorderly element which calls for revolution as the only effective weapon of social improvement, they deliberately and systematically confuse the two elements. They do their best to stigmatize as "Bolshevism" all agitation for a redistribution of industrial power and many of the efforts of labor to use the strike for the enforcement of industrial demands. Formerly when the unions were weak and strikes usually failed, labor was encouraged to depend upon them for the protection of its interests. Now that the unions are stronger and a strike is more likely to succeed in enforcing labor's demands, the tendency is to limit its employment and to prevent by law all the unions whose labor is affected with a public interest from employing the weapon.

The net result of the prevailing attitude of mind is to invoke the majesty of the state and the prestige of society against labor in the case of all important controversies. These powerful agencies are used to hinder the wage-earners from insisting upon any radical change or any substantial improvement in their social and economic status. In substance the press, the politicians and the employing class are now saying to labor, "We forbid you to challenge the existing distribution of economic power in this country. We will not discuss as an open question whether that power, as it is now exercised and distributed, makes for productive efficiency, establishes a high and general standard of living or supplies the wage-earners with any sufficient motive to be actively interested in their work and loyal to their employment. We start from the assumption that no redistribution of economic power is desirable or safe. If you attempt to take any part of our existing power away from us, we shall denounce you as enemies of public security and employ against you the moral and physical authority of the state. Moreover, if you continue to threaten our vested and funded interests, the state, under our control, will recognize no limitation upon the exercise of its paramount authority. By raising the question of public security, as we have done in the case of the Boston policemen, the steel strike and the coal-miners, we shall deprive you of any rights as a class which the community is bound to respect. It will not be for you to decide whether or not you want to work or on what terms you prefer to work. You must work on the terms which the state in combination with your employers decides to be just."

An attitude of this kind is, we submit, tantamount to the establishment of an autocratic government in American industry without the consent of the governed. It tosses the moral and legal authority of the state into the arena of class controversy regardless of those precautionary limitations on the exercise of sovereign authority which Americans have always plumed themselves on recognizing and preserving. The fathers of the Republic were almost morbidly conscious of the state's liability to error, whenever a violent gust of popular passion and fear controlled its behavior, and they attempted consequently to define the limitations which should in the interest of social security and justice be imposed on administrative and legislative action. But the bills of rights which they framed as the expression of ultimate political principle were designed to secure justice to the individual. They did not make any similar attempt to secure social justice—justice, that is, for large classes in the community whose members all suffer from common disabilities or enjoy common privileges. The existing ferment derives from the existence of social injustice. The classes which suffer from such injustice are not protected by the constitutional bills of rights. They are not as yet protected by any new body of social law and practice which gives a kind of security and status to the worker similar to that which the bills of rights give to the property-owner. The workers are protected only by the right to refuse to work when they do not consent to the conditions upon which work is offered to them. To deprive them of this right or restrict its exercise, except when the democratic state has advanced much further in the organization of social justice, is tantamount to the

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promulgation by the state of a claim to infallibility in its social policy.

We submit, then, that the proposed limitations of the right to strike at a time when the state, in the opinion of so many of its citizens, has failed to provide for the economic enfranchisement and social equality of the wage-earners as a class would constitute an act of class violence under the forms of law. It would undermine the moral unity of American society. In making this statement we are fully aware of the existence of another side to the shield. We admit that the exercise of the right to strike by all the workers in a "key" industry such as coal-mining or transportation might, if abused, become intolerable, and raise questions of social security which a responsible government could not ignore. We not only admit, but we insist that the strike is a dangerous and disorderly weapon, which should in the long run disappear from the institutions of an industrial democracy. But at present American industry is not democratically organized. It rests on the fears, the necessities and the ignorant docility of the majority of the workers, not on their free self-conscious consent. The only protection they have against what they consider to be and often is exploitation and oppression is the strike; and in spite of the resulting danger to society it would be disastrous to deprive them of it until the quickened conscience of society has built up a new body of industrial law which secures to the worker partnership with the property-owner in the control of the economic power and resources of the community.

The real task of social salvation and appeasement consists in framing and testing such a new body of social law, method and practice. But while this task is being performed the better American national tradition clearly calls for patient good-humored toleration of differences, freedom and candor of discussion, a firm confidence in its saving value of conference as the agency of the immediately necessary working of social adjustments. It calls for a clear recognition on the part of the employing class and the "public" that they may be wrong in refusing to organized labor any redistribution of the existing fund of economic power, and that if they should be wrong the very means which they are taking to save society will tend to destroy it. The veracious American attitude in the present crisis would rather avoid than seek to raise questions of "law and order"; it would adjure the pretence to infallibility and immaculate righteousness; it would prefer negotiation and conciliation to fights to a finish and mutual extermination; and it would engage in a patient and exhaustive research for principles and methods of social behavior which the state can reasonably ask both parties to observe. The leaders and thinkers of industrial civilization have as yet not worked out such principles, although they have made some progress toward their formulation. Until they do, dangerous conflicts between those who possess the power and those who want to share it are inevitable. The best that the state can do during the interregnum towards the appeasement of such conflicts is to remain true to the traditional American suspicion of state infallibility and paramountcy, to the traditional American reluctance to coerce an aggrieved minority and to the traditional American faith in the ability of the people to work through the most difficult and embittered conflicts to an ultimately liberating truth —provided all parties, all classes and all minorities obtain a full and a fair hearing.

Europe's Misery and America's Complacency

THE New York World printed recently an eloquent indictment of the "cool complacency" of America in the presence of the European tragedy. It was written by Mr. Pierrepont B. Noyes, who, as the prospective American member of the Inter-allied Rhineland Commission, certainly occupies one of the most important posts on the continent. He describes the peace treaty as "the most difficult and most dangerous in all history"; there is, we think, no competent observer to dispute its difficulties and its dangers. Therefore, says Mr. Noyes, America "owes to Europe, to herself, prompt and hearty participation in the peace councils and in the League of Nations until all political readjustments shall be completed, and she must furnish supplies on credit to whatever extent may prove to be necessary for the re-establishment of European industry." That is all of it true. Yet the financial operation, though recommended by the leading international bankers, has little popular support, and the population at large has in a short twelve months become "coolly complacent" about participation in European politics.

What is the cause? For partisan purposes it may be convenient to put the tragedy of Europe and the indifference of America on the Republican Senators; for tactical purposes it may be convenient to argue that prompt ratification would straighten out the whole business. But the facts do not permit of such an easy formula. The plight of Europe is not the result of America's moral withdrawal. All the suffering and disorder were developed at the very time when America was most intimately associated with European diplomacy, so intimately in

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fact that she had sacrificed leadership and government at home in order that the President could participate at Paris. Europe did not go "bankrupt" when Mr. Wilson left Paris and the Senate began to delay the treaty. The relation between our withdrawal and Europe's misery is not that of cause and effect. The two things are the effects of the same cause.

The cause of both is the diplomatic defeat which America suffered at Paris. It happened, not through any peculiar virtues of ours, but because of historical and geographical accident, that the American program of peace embodied the only impulse sufficiently constructive and therefore sufficiently disinterested, to reorganize the shattered fragments of the European system. It provided for a plan of reconciliation, in which the Great Powers, abiding by their official ideals, cooperated to restore and integrate the continent, particularly in the region of Central and Eastern Europe. Now it also happened that such a peace was the only one capable of sustaining the enthusiasm of America for European affairs; only a great plan of reconciliation was really powerful enough to overcome the deep tradition of isolation. Superficially, this did not seem to be the case. American opinion supported a vindictive peace and did not, except in a few cases, protest at the breach of faith which the treaty involved. Nevertheless, the disorders of Europe, which are the result of the diplomacy which made the peace, have subtly and deeply reinfected Americans with their old distrusts. To be sure they do not quite see the connection between the victory of the Foreign Offices and the anarchy of Eastern Europe, and so they are quite prepared to applaud the jingoism of the Foreign Offices while they shrink from its results. No doubt this argues that American opinion is irresponsible. It is. Censorship and propaganda have succeeded in concealing the defeat of America's war aims, they have even succeeded in making Americans rejoice at their own defeat. But neither censorship nor propaganda is powerful enough to subdue the uneasiness of the ordinary American at the obscure intrigue and to him hopeless tangle of Eastern Europe.

How this effect is produced was recently illustrated in a flagrant manner. On October 16th, the American newspapers carried with great headlines a London dispatch announcing that Petrograd was doomed, Denikin was sweeping up towards Moscow from the South, Kolchak "closing in again from the East" and that Germany and the neutrals were to join the blockade of Soviet Russia. This is what we were permitted to know. The inside information at that moment was of a totally different character. That information was available to reporters who understood the intricacies of European politics. The Manchester Guardian correspondent, for example, understood them. This is what he telegraphed his paper on October 14th, the day before the propaganda dispatch was sent from London to America announcing the impending victory of the counter-revolutionary Russian Generals. The Temps speaking by direct inspiration from the Quai d'Orsay, "asks its readers to beware of considering the machinations and fortunes of these Russo-German raiders to be of the least importance in themselves. If we do that, it says 'we shall be in the position of the men in the cave of Plato, who see shadows passing on the wall and endeavor to judge from them what is really happening outside.' Though the Temps says no more for the moment, everyone here in touch with the view taken of the situation in Russia in official quarters understands to what the Temps is alluding. It is the critical situation of the reactionary forces and Denikin, their real leader." Thus on the day in which the propaganda machine was bamboozing Americans about the Denikin forces, the Temps, in the cryptic manner beloved of continental diplomacy, was informing the initiated that the French Foreign Office did not take these raids seriously.

Then when we read in the appeal from Mr. Noyes that America must maintain a "moral leadership," the answer is that Americans simply do not know how to play the game as it is being played in Europe. They do not understand it; they do not comprehend the involutions by which unauthorized British agents in the Baltic Provinces (see the Manchester Guardian, October 15, 1919) use the Prussian junker von der Goltz for some undefined purpose west of Petrograd; they do not understand the conflict between British and French Baltic policy in which the living body of Esthonia, Latvia and Lithuania is the stake. They are pretty well convinced that President Wilson did not know half the time what was going on, and they have a sense, not altogether articulate, that events in Europe still confirm the ancient rule that European interests are peculiar to Europe.

This is deeply unfortunate. For it is as true today as it ever was that there can be no permanent peace in America with America outside the concert of nations. But you cannot enter the concert of nations and by your benign presence set things right. You have to have a policy, and the only policy that Americans understand is that which President Wilson tried to formulate. The defeat of that policy has created a diplomatic vacuum, and the opportunity of leadership squandered at the Hotel Crillon we shall not easily regain. Having been defeated in our own purposes, we naturally fell immediately

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into the dangerous role of being the tail to someone else's kite. Deprived of the only policy in which we had the impulse to lead, or the technical competence, our diplomatic influence is simply added strength to the very forces which defeated us.

The policy which has prevailed on the continent since the armistice is of course the real cause of the misery of Europe. In what hae it consisted? First, in a prolonged and intense blockade of the greatest industrial section of Europe and the greatest food producing section of Europe; second, in the extravagant policy of expeditionary forces scattered from the Rhine to Vladivostok; third, in the incitement of destructive wars at most of the strategic junctions of Eastern Europe and Nearer Asia; fourth, in the fomenting of a suicidal militarism in the Balkanized region of Central Europe; fifth, in the destruction of international morale by violations of faith with all our enemies and by gross and illegal aggression against Russia and China.

America ought not to be "coolly complacent"; it ought to be hotly indignant. But only the cranks are indignant. The rest of the population, having been forced by propaganda to believe that all this is necessary to overcome Bolshevism and pro-Germanism, is silent and it acquiesces. But it will lavish no money upon such a Europe, and it hopes that the Senate will quickly ratify with reservations that retain all vital decisions as to our own course in the hands of elected American officials. The European diplomats have succeeded in escaping the moral denunciation from America which they deserve, but they have lost American support which they need.

The remedy must originate in Europe. The altruism of any people is narrowly limited, and just as it was necessary for Europe to convince Americans that this was a war of liberation so they will have to convince them again that they are bent upon a peace of liberation. The United States is not easily drawn into Europe. The basis on which it could have been drawn is shattered. A new basis must be found. What can be done in the way of credit must be done, and participation in the council of the League there will be. But as Mr. Noyes fears, both will be half-hearted. That is a fact, not a wish. If we had our way, we should make it otherwise. Freed of the sheer entanglements of the Covenant and the French Alliance, we should wish to see America have its share of the burden of European reconstruction. But Americans as a whole are not prepared for whole-souled participation in the kind of Europe which the diplomats have created. Instinctively, vaguely, in their bones they shrink from it, mere words will not change them.

The man who knowing the misery of Europe ignored it would be a poor specimen indeed. The plight of the common people is beyond words terrible, and if the bankers or the administration have the energy to organize a relief they will deserve the blessing of mankind. But they will meet as an obstacle at every turn the appalling results of the diplomatic debacle at Paris. The immeasurable harm done by that disastrous conference has left its effect on the mentality and emotion of the whole world. By flouting idealism and aggravating selfishness, the diplomats have let loose here as well as abroad a flood of know-nothingism, of contempt for all things alien, against which the more decent conscience of men struggles in vain. Some saw all this written in the treaty of Versailles. They read in it the doom of European order and the rupture of American cooperation. If they cried out, perhaps too shrilly, it must be remembered that the disappointment turned on results of which no observer now denies the frightful cost.

The Injunction Against the Miners

WHETHER the Attorney General has made out a technical case entitling him to an injunction against the coal strike is a question the courts will have to deal with. If he is sustained, his victory will be a purely technical one, for every consideration of common sense and common fairness points to the conclusion that in passing the Lever act Congress never contemplated that it should be applied in such a case as the present one.

The Lever act recites in its preamble that "by reason of the existence of a state of war, it is essential to the national security and defense, for the successful prosecution of the war, and for the support and maintenance of the army and navy to assure an adequate supply . . . of foods, feeds, fuels," etc. "For such purposes," the act continues, "the instrumentalities, means, methods, process, authorities, duties, obligations and prohibitions hereinafter set forth are created, established, conferred and prescribed." Does Mr. Palmer expect us to believe that he is asking for an injunction "for the successful prosecution of the war" or "for the support and maintenance of the army and navy"? Is there the remotest possibility that Congress would have passed the Lever act in its present form if it had known that it would be invoked nearly a year after the cessation of hostilities, when the enemy was disarmed and helpless, and our own army virtually demobilized? Congress was legislating to defeat Germany, not to assist capital in a conflict with labor.

The Lever act covers not only agricultural prod-

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ucts and fuel but fertilizer ingredients, agricultural tools and equipment, and machinery used in producing fuel. Does any one suppose that Congress actually intended to make it a criminal offense to strike in any one of these numerous industries? The Lever act does not specifically include labor unions. It is merely by a process of construction that they are brought within its terms at all. To apply them to an ordinary strike for higher wages and shorter hours is a feat of construction which only a severe prejudice against labor unions can accomplish. Moreover, the activity of the Department of Justice is in flagrant disregard of the spirit of the provisoes in recent appropriation bills, prohibiting the use of the appropriation in prosecuting labor organization under the anti-trust laws.

The Lever act is a criminal statute. It contemplates indictment and trial by jury for any violation. It nowhere expressly authorizes injunction. Whether an injunction is technically permissible depends upon whether the court would be inclined to extend and apply the dangerous precedent of the Debs case. Certainly, however, the use of an injunction in such a case is a violation of the spirit, if not of the letter, of the labor clauses of the Clayton act of 1914, which declare that no injunction shall be issued in labor disputes against strikes or peaceful picketing and persuasion. It will strengthen the conviction of organized labor, already expressed at the recent annual convention of the American Federation of Labor, that the injunction in labor disputes is coming more and more to be a tool of capital in suppressing labor union activities.

It is reported that the next move of the Government may be to request a mandatory injunction directing the union leaders to order the men to return to work. It is difficult to conceive of a move more completely subversive of the rights of citizens, and more futile in achieving the objects which the Government has in mind, even assuming that the leaders choose to obey it rather than go to jail. It will not break the strike. The rank and file of the strikers have the intelligence to know that an order issued under duress of an illegal and unprecedented court process is not to be taken at its face value.

By resting its extraordinary exercise of power on an interpretation of war legislation, which, if valid at all, is valid only on the most technical grounds, and by resorting to a legal weapon the use of which in labor disputes Congress has emphatically condemned, the administration is exciting in the workingmen of the country a resentment against the existing operation of law and a contempt for the vaunted impartiality of the Government, which it will bitterly rue in the years to come.

Always in the Van

Senator Walsh: Now, I suppose, you will agree that there has been no force in America that has done more . . . . to better the living conditions of the workmen than organizations of labor?

Mr. Gary: I deny it positively, emphatically. I want to say that the United States Steel Corporation has been in the van all the time.

IN the van in what way? Once in the history of the Steel Corporation a Congress, more useful than the present one, sent into the iron and steel industry a committee of investigation. The strike of 1910 had impressed that Congress with its own lack of information. It called upon the Department of Labor for an official inquiry. And the Department, in perhaps the most searching report it has ever made upon conditions in a single industry, brought back to Washington facts that challenge Mr. Gary's description.

Measure the Steel Corporation in the light of comparative data. By 1910 the 8-hour day had secured the backing of many state and federal authorities. The first law establishing an 8-hour day for federal employees had (by that time) been on the statute books more than forty years. In one form or another, thirty-six states had established by law an 8-hour day for some part of their employees. The private employer was following more slowly. But census reports for the 86 principal manufacturing industries employing more than 10,000 workmen show that, by 1909, in only 20 of these industries were any considerable number of wage-earners (more than 10 per cent.) forced to work longer than 60 hours a week.

These figures offer a comparison for conditions in the steel plants. "It was found in this investigation," says the Department of Labor in its report, "that nearly 43 per cent. of the 173,000 employees in the iron and steel industry were working at least 72 hours per week, or twelve hours per day for 6 days a week." (Document No. 110, 62nd Cong. 1st Session, I, XV.) What conclusion can be drawn that reflects any credit on Mr. Gary's corporation? At a time when comparatively few of the principle manufacturing industries were making even as many as 10 per cent. of their employees work 60 hours a week, the captains of the iron and steel industry were forcing more than 40 per cent. of their own men to work for 72. Nor do these figures alone tell the story. The report of the Department of Labor declares, "50,000, or 29 per cent. of the 173,000 employees of the blast furnaces and steel works and rolling mills covered by this report customarily worked 7 days per week—and 20 per cent. of them worked 84 *hours or more* per week, which, in effect, means a 12-hour day every

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day in the week, including Sunday . . . The hardship of a 12-hour day and a 7-day week is still further increased by the fact that every week or two weeks, as the case may be, when the employees on the day shift are transferred to the night shift, and vice versa, employees remain on duty without relief either 18 or 24 hours, according to the practice adopted for the change of shift." (Document No. 110, 62nd Congress, 1st Session, I, XIV.) In its own words, finally, the Department reaches this conclusion: "Years ago the 10-hour day became almost a standard; since that time further reductions have brought the working day to 9 and, in many cases, to 8 hours. It is, therefore, in striking contrast to this general tendency in other industries to find in a great basic industry, such as that part of the iron and steel industry covered in this report, that approximately only 14 per cent. of the 173,000 employees work less than 60 hours per week; 63 per cent. work 72 hours or over per week."

If one turns to that section of the report given to wages it is to discover that wages fixed by the corporation did not vary greatly, in 1910, from wages paid by the independent companies; in certain crafts, higher; in others, slightly less. Nor was the wage scale, for the industry as a whole, far in advance of prevailing standards. 1910 was the year in which the first proposal for a minimum wage was made in an American state legislature; and in Nebraska 20 cents an hour was proposed as the bare minimum on which a workman could subsist. How many wage-earners in the iron and steel industry were receiving that estimated minimum in 1910? The report of the Department of Labor shows that almost half of them (49.69 per cent.) were being paid no more than 18 cents an hour—and that only one man in four was getting as much as 25 cents. Moreover, lest it be judged that the wages of the great majority were either sufficient or were examined at a time unfavorable for the companies, the report of the Department of Labor states: "During the past ten years the wages of iron and steel workers have not increased at all proportionately to the cost of living . . . During the ten years, 1901 to 1910, the retail prices of food increased 32.8 per cent. while the hourly wages of unskilled laborers increased only 17.5 per cent. During the same period the wages of other classes increased even less." (Document No. 110, 62nd Congress, 1st Session, III, 23.) It is the story of wages lagging behind prices, a story many of us pretend to discover for the first time today, but a harsh story for those who bear the burden.

All this was nine years ago—and things have changed since then? Well, it was Mr. Gary's boast to the Senate that his corporation had been in the van of the trade unionists "all the time." At one period—the one occasion of federal investigation—definitely it was not in the van. And how much, when it comes to that, have things changed since 1910? There has been a creditable development in "welfare work" in the plants of the Steel Corporation—as in the plants of many other companies. And "welfare work" has its value. But wages and hours? Today many employers have recognized the merit in the 8-hour day, and adopted it. The Steel Corporation, Mr. Gary told the Senate, would be ready to adopt the 8-hour day—if it could be made "practicable." It is apparently not practicable yet. More than a fourth of all the corporation's employees are still working twelve hours; almost forty per cent. more are working ten . . . Wages, of course, have gone up since 1910. That is generally the case in all industries. And in the Steel Corporation there are individual wages that have gone high, indeed. "Highest earnings, rollers, $32.56 per day," was Mr. Gary's statement to the Senate Committee. A number of questions, however, developed the fact the number of rollers earning $32.56 per day, was 1. There were others, to be sure, earning more than $20 a day; and some earning considerable less. The average, Mr. Gary said, was $6.27. Foremen were included in the figuring that brought this average—foremen and superintendents. And the figures used were those for workers employed in "manufacturing," as distinguished from "unskilled labor," "transportation" and "miscellaneous." Nevertheless the fact remains that the average wage, so defined, has risen 114 per cent. since 1914. And the cost of living has risen at the same time. In Chicago, for instance—many of the Steel Corporation's plants are near Chicago—the Department of Labor estimates that the increase in cost of food and clothing, since 1914, is 157 per cent.—which is better than Steel Corporation wages by a good margin.

Wages and hours are vital matters for the workman; but it is not in wages and hours that the United States Steel Corporation has ever treated its employees most shabbily. Where it has balked them most completely is in its refusal to give them even that elementary degree of control over the industry to which they give their lives that comes in trade union organization. It was almost in its first meeting (see minutes of June 17, 1901) that the Executive Committee of the Steel Corporation resolved: "That we are unalterably opposed to any extension of union labor, and advise subsidiary companies to take a firm position when these questions come up, and say they are not going to recognize it." To this rigid policy the cor-

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poration has dedicated its great power. It has fought collective bargaining steadily and relentlessly. As far back as 1910, in this same investigation, the report of the Department of Labor declared: "The workmen have no effective means of determining the questions under which they work or even of calling attention to the features which they consider unjust. Apart from the fact that a very large number of the workmen cannot make themselves understood either by their superior officers or by many of their fellow workmen, they are almost entirely without organization through which alone their demands can be made effective . . . The stockholders . . . manifest scarcely any feeling of responsibility for the conditions under which their employees work. The men in direct control of these corporations are the presidents and managers, whose success is gauged almost entirely by the condition of the balance sheet and the regularity of the dividend. Their immediate self-interest and natural inclination, therefore, lie in the establishment and maintenance of only those working conditions from which a sure and immediate profit can be foreseen."

Here, indeed, begins and ends the leadership of the United States Steel Corporation in respect to the relations between employer and workman. Alert to detect the first inclination of its men toward union membership, militarizing industry with its espionage system, absolute in the bleak villages of western Pennsylvania—a bulwark against industrial democracy and a shield for the last reactionary employers—it is in that role and no other that the Steel Corporation has been in the van, undisputedly, "all the time."

Compulsory Conference and the Coal Strike

THE administration cannot be congratulated on its handling during the past twelve months of the industrial problem in its relation to labor unrest. In this as in so many other respects President Wilson has lived from hand to mouth; and he has talked at different times with different voices. In his message to Congress of last December he denied the existence of any industrial problem which the government and the public could not safely leave to the initiative and the untutored private interest of the business man. Later in his manifesto from Paris on industrial democracy he assumed another tone. He expressly approved certain radical principles which, if logically applied, would have resulted in a reorganization of industry for the purpose of increasing the power and responsibility of the wage-earner. But he has never conceived a consecutive policy, based upon an analysis of the causes of the existing ferment, and he has never expressed a living conviction as to the true nature of the public interests which are compromised by the existing conflict and the constructive action which the government should take on behalf of a more workable industrial organization.

He came nearest to acting on such a conviction when he summoned the Industrial Conference. Conference is, we believe, the only possible immediate agency of inter-class adjustment as it is of international adjustment. But if conference is to succeed both parties to it must agree to accept certain common fundamental principles. The Industrial Conference at Washington foundered because it lacked the guidance of a pilot and a well-plotted course. Since its wreck the President in handling the coal strike has abandoned his conviction in favor of conference. Although the issue between the coal operators and the miners turned upon the obligation of both parties to confer and upon the ethics of fair negotiation, the administration did not have the insight and the courage to insist on negotiation. Instead, after feebly proposing an arbitration which in the absence of principles of adjustment recognized by both parties could have resulted only in an unsatisfactory and unprincipled compromise, he fell back when the strike took place on the power of coercion. He has rewarded the loyal service of the unions during the war by refusing to consider the merits of one of the most serious industrial controversies of the present generation and by placing at the disposal of their adversaries the vast prestige and so far as possible the physical power of the American government.

This is a grave indictment, but it is not an exaggeration. Examine the record. As soon as the armistice was signed the administration abandoned with precipitation all those national controls over the prices and distribution of basic commodities which Congress had established for the duration of the war. It took this step in spite of the fact that the artificial economic conditions created by the war still persisted and that the abandonment of these controls enabled private interests to take advantage of the dislocation of prices and to reap extortionate profits. An orgy of profiteering followed and prices, instead of falling, increased. The wage-earners finding their standard of living compromised began to demand corresponding increases of wages; and these in turn were used as an excuse for an additional increase in the price level. It was necessary to call a halt on this endless and disastrous process of inflation. The President did so by asking labor to postpone its demands for in-

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creases in wages. He would have been justified in adopting this policy, provided he had at the same time taken effective steps to resume control over prices. But his only remedial policy consisted in the attempt to eliminate profiteering by criminal prosecution. That attempt is failing and was certain to fail . Its failure puts the administration in the position of having connived at the exploitation of the artificial economic war conditions for the benefit of aggressively selfish business interests, while at the same time appealing to the patriotism of the wage-earners to put up with the extortion, and pay out of their pockets a substantial part of its cost. The administration did nothing to provide in advance against the outbreak of unrest. It did nothing effective after the unrest to deal with its manifest causes. It had no policy except that of morally coercing the class which was suffering in consequence of its negligence to submit like good milch cows to their own exploitation.

In the case of the coal industry the irresponsibility of the administration's policy and its tendency to discriminate against the wage-earner and in favor of the profiteering business man received its consummate expression. During the war the government properly established the price of coal at a high level, because only high prices which rendered profitable the operation of mines with a high cost of production, would bring into existence the maximum output. The policy resulted in enormous profits for mines which could produce coal cheaply, but it was justified under the circumstances, and it was redeemed by the adoption of supplementary measures of economy. Th administration with the assistance of the operators worked out an improved distribution of the coal and an accounting system which helped to reduce waste and enable the management to trace the responsibility for inefficiency. The government, that is, organized the coal industry as a public service. Inasmuch as it guaranteed steady employment to the miners it had some justification in asking them, as it did, not to press during the war their demands for increased wages. A few months after the armistice was signed, the coal administration declared that so far as the coal operators were concerned the country was at peace. It removed the harness from the coal industry. It became once more an industry operated exclusively for private profit. A diminution of prices might have followed, for the supply which it was profitable to produce at the level of war prices exceeded the demand, but the operators refused to permit a lower level of prices. They preferred to restrict the production of their mines. The consequence was partial unemployment, and diminished earnings for the coal miners at a time when the cost of living was steadily rising. Their present demands for higher wages and for steady employment at shorter hours was born of this experience. They did not want the price of coal to be maintained to the disadvantage of the public and at their expense. But mark what happened after they presented their demand. So far as the operators' profits were concerned, there had been no war since last February. The government had abandoned all the mechanism of control which tended towards the operation of the industry as a public service. But as soon as the miners, as contrasted with the operators, acted as if the war was over and proposed to negotiate a new wage contract the war suddenly came back. The coal operators refused all negotiations with the miners upon any question of hours and wages, covered by the war contract. The war was alive in so far as it helped the interests of the operators and it was dead in so far as it injured their interests. It was alive in so far as it injured the interests of the miners, but it was dead in so far as it might have helped the interests of the miners.

The government began by conniving at this policy of discrimination and ended by actively supporting its results. It has acted on the theory that no public interest was involved in arranging negotiations for fair terms, or in the redress of any injustice from which the complaining miners may have suffered. The public as represented by the government had no interest in the controversy except that of obtaining its needed supply of coal. The wilful stoppage of the production of coal by the miners was considered as an anti-social act which the government was under a clear obligation to denounce and defeat. There is, of course, an obvious and consequently a dangerous element of truth in the government's contention. No society which retained enough collected energy to protect its own integrity could tolerate in a vital industry a strike which was used to enforce outrageous and impossible demands. But the distressing effects of a coal strike on innocent consumers afford no sufficient excuse for the assumption of an attitude of indifference to the merits of the dispute in which the strike originated. On the contrary, before depriving the coal miners, so far as it can, of their only safeguard against injustice and their most effective weapon with which to obtain a higher standard of living, the government should guarantee a full and fair consideration of the miners' claims. This is precisely what the Wilson adminstration failed to do. Although the working arrangements between the coal operators and the miners have long been and should be adjusted by negotiation, the operators refused to negotiate about an essential part of the miners' demands. They declared that a war which had ceased

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to exist for them existed for the miners. The government, instead of falling back on a proposal to arbitrate—a method of adjustment which is much less sound than conference—should have used all its influence in favor of full and fair negotiation. If it had insisted on negotiation on the part of the operators, it could with justice have insisted on a postponement of the strike by the miners, and it could, if the miners had refused this reasonable condition, have in that event properly applied coercion.

Even now it is not too late to revive this policy and to apply it to the settlement of the strike. The administration has only to follow the admirable and illuminating example offered by the British government in putting an end to the railroad strike. The British government also made the mistake of permitting the interruption of negotiation, but once the fight was on it did not commit the further mistake of insisting on victory at any public expense. Although it had even a better excuse for embarrassing the strikers by throwing its war power into the scale against them, it did not deny to the railroad employees the exercise of the right to strike. What it did was to resume negotiations at the first favorable opportunity and to reach by these means a mutually acceptable settlement. The result according to the New Statesman is a beneficial "clearing of the industrial air." "The prospects for peace in the industrial world, for at any rate some time to come, seem not worse but distinctly brighter than in normal times."

The administration can apply the principle underlying this excellent English example to its own difficulties and to the industrial disorder in this country. It can offer not to arbitrate, but to mediate and to use mediation as an agency of negotiation. It is incredible under the circumstances that further negotiations, conducted through the medium of the administration sustained by all the influences of the administration and based on the assumption that the war is over for the miners as well as the operators, would not succeed. If it did succeed, its success would clear the industrial air just as the settlement of the railroad strike by negotiation cleared it in Great Britain. A verdict which was obtained by coercion and the defeat of either side would settle nothing. It would intensify the labor unrest and provoke a renewal of the conflict by the defeated party. But a settlement obtained by negotiation would furnish to the country a much needed demonstration of the barbarism of "fighting to a finish," and a much needed vindication of the necessity of using considerate conciliatory methods in moving towards industrial peace. When it pleaded for the adoption of this method, the Brotherhood of Locomotive Engineers displayed a statesmanship which is unfortunately lacking in the existing attitude of any organization of employers and in that of the government.

Amend the Plumb Plan

WHEN the Plumb plan was first submitted to Congress, its sponsors wisely declared it to be only in tentative form. Mr. Garretson, spokesman for the organized employees, told the Senate committee that only the general principles had been approved by the unions which he represented, but that "there has been no endorsement by us of any given detail of that plan." Mr. Plumb himself has consistently maintained an open mind toward suggested amendments.

The one serious defect of the Plumb plan lies in its machinery for wage control. It sets up a board of wage adjustment with unlimited power over wage scales, composed entirely of representatives of the same classified and official employees whose wages and salaries the board must pass upon. If the board is deadlocked, there is an appeal to the directors of the operating corporation, which again can be controlled by a combination of the interested employees and officials. Mr. Plumb's bill attempts, it is true, to create an automatic differentiation of interest between the wage earners and the salaried officials, by giving the latter twice as large a percentage share of surplus earnings, but the failure of this device can be mathematically demonstrated. So long as this wage machinery is retained, it is impossible to accept the bill as adequately safeguarding the public interest.

If the railway employees will accept an amendment of this feature of their plan they will in our judgment enormously strengthen their position without yielding a single essential principle. Fortunately, there is evidence that they will accept such an amendment. In a recent public address their counsel, Mr. Plumb, referred to The New Republic's discussion of the wage machinery in his plan, and agreed that there was much force to the objections which it raised. He issued a friendly challenge to his critics to frame a concrete amendment remedying this defect, and undertook to secure for such an amendment careful and sympathetic consideration.

We gladly accept Mr. Plumb's challenge, and suggest that he insert, in Article III, Section 4, of the Sims bill, at the end of the second paragraph, the following words:

> "Provided, that no order or decision of said Central Board of Wages and Working Conditions, or of said Board of Directors on any

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questions decided by it on appeal, shall become effective until approved by the Interstate Commerce Commission."

Such an amendment will be a recognition of the fact that since wages are a major element in costs of operation, the public body which fixes rates should have the final determination of the wage scale. It will be a recognition of the fact that employees are engaged in a public service, and cannot arrogate to themselves the exclusive right to determine what the compensation for their services shall be. It will deprive the enemies of the Plumb plan of their most effective argument, and will greatly hearten those who see in the plan a hopeful and practical experiment in the democratization of industry.

The Printing Trade Dispute and the New Republic

OUR readers will, we trust, indulge us if we appear to devote greater space to a statement of our attitude towards the printing trades dispute than its absolute importance might warrant. That dispute, we agree, bulks very small in comparison with the great industrial disturbances that threaten to upset the calculations of the whole people. It does not, however, seem so small to us, since it has stopped our voice for a period intolerably prolonged—as we feel—and may quite conceivably subject us to further vexations and inconvenience. Such considerations apart, we feel under special obligation to express our views of a dispute that directly affects us, inasmuch as we have never hesitated to express our views of disputes affecting other enterprises. If there is any special premium upon opinions from under the harrow, we lay claim to such a premium now.

At the outset, we wish to disclaim any such comprehensive knowledge of all the details of the dispute as would justify us in passing final judgment. We have not been a party to the dispute, nor privy to the councils of any party. We have sought light from the several parties, and in our inquiries have met with the utmost consideration and candor. But necessarily the several disputants see, and present, the same facts in different colors, and unfortunately such colors do not blend in the white that would represent a true and properly proportioned judgment. We shall therefore be chary of approval or condemnation. Nevertheless we have arrived at various conclusions that bear upon the general policies, involved in the Printing Trade dispute. And it is with those general policies that we are chiefly concerned.

Let us first consider the underlying substance of the dispute, the demands as to wages and hours that precipitated it and that in fact keep it alive. For many months prior to the outbreak of actual hostilities there had been a strong demand among the members of certain branches of the trade in New York for a forty-four hour week and a fourteen dollar increase in wages. As to the point of wages, it is fairly clear to us that a substantial increase would be justified by the facts of the cost of living. According to the analysis of the United States Department of Labor, $1800 is about the minimum on which an average family can live decently in New York City. A pressman working under the existing scale for fifty weeks of the year would earn, without overtime, $1800. But that leaves no margin for families with more than average expenses, or even for the complete covering of average expenses for men who are unable to work, or find work, every week of the year but two. The employers have made known their willingness to grant a six dollar increase. Whether that is adequate or not could be determined by negotiations, in which both sides, we understand, are willing to take part. The employers further make the very wise and reasonable concession that in case living costs, as measured by the Department of Labor index advance materially, a demand for increased wages should be entertained during the life of the contract they propose.

The demand for a forty-four hour week also seems to us reasonable. Eight hours for five days and four for Saturday do not stand out as exceptionally liberal hours in American industry. We believe that under such an arrangement it would be possible to get out of a man as much work as can be got out of him in a longer day. That is not saying that the forty-four hour week will in this instance prove as productive as the forty-eight hour week. It all depends upon the capacity of the industry to enlist the zeal of the workers, and it is coming to be fairly plain that something besides higher wages and shorter hours is required in industry if the zeal of the worker is to be kept at a high pitch. So far as we know the printing industry is not as yet making any effort to find out what that something is. The employers had already agreed to a forty-four hour week, to go into effect in May 1921, thereby registering their belief that the industry can live under it. The New York employers would have accepted the forty-four hour week from October 1919 if the same day could have been fixed for the country at large. We admit the force of the argument that such contracts should be as nearly uniform as practicable, yet we doubt the wisdom of the employers in insisting on the point, in view

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of the state of feeling among the men in New York, of which they were fully cognizant.

Nevertheless, the employers were willing to arbitrate the question, being confident that no arbitration would set aside the agreement fixing the date of May 1921 for the introduction of the forty-four hour week. In the same belief, the men refused to discuss the question of hours—a mistake we believe: nothing ought to be excluded in advance from the negotiations. That involved another point. Arbitration is provided for by the general contract signed between the international and the employers and which the international officers assert to be valid, though its validity is denied by the recalcitrant locals. Technically, therefore, the employers had a right to call in the international to discipline the locals that refused to arbitrate any item in dispute. And technically the international was bound to reduce such locals to subjection, if necessary, by suppression. As it happened, two of the locals were already at odds with the international, having refused to pay in their contributions to the national treasury, alleging financial irregularities. Instead, they put the funds in trust until their dispute with the international should be cleared up, thereby maintaining, technically, their standing with the international, as they understood it. As the officers of the international understood it, they were technically not only not in good standing, but dead to the international altogether. And as the employers were under agreement to employ international members only, they were technically required to lock out the members of the recalcitrant unions—something they were perhaps rather too eager to do. The compositors' union, equally insistent upon the fourteen dollar raise and the forty-four hour week, retained its standing in the international, technically, while in large measure attaining the ends that could be attained by a strike, through the institution of "vacations."

Now, we submit, there are rather more technicalities involved in this situation than would seem to comport with a sincere effort to reach an understanding on fundamentals. In a time like the present, when the whole industrial world is in a state of unrest, the less action turns on technicalities the nearer we approach sane statesmanship. We adhere to the principle that national or international unions are essential to the welfare of labor and of society, and that they must manage to maintain discipline. But is this a well chosen time to enforce discipline by calling on employers to lock out union men who command the sympathy of great numbers of workers who remain within the ranks of the international? We adhere to the principle that labor ought to live up to the letter and the spirit of every agreement that its representatives have made. But we also believe that the employers ought to exercise the utmost care in avoiding the exaction of terms that discredit the representatives of labor with the rank and file. The labor contract is not on a par with a contract for the purchase and delivery of steel or cement or stocks. It has not been stiffened up by long experience. Those who wish to see it become adequately stable for business convenience will not load it with such freight as the postponement of the forty-four week to 1921.

So much for our theoretical attitude. We refuse to take sides in a dispute in which the contestants are now, and have been from the beginning, more eager to conquer than to work out a solution that will allay bitterness and set the industry on the road toward the more constructive enterprise of achieving efficiency. But the New Republic is being printed: and does that not mean that we are taking sides? No. From the outset we have refused to regard ourselves as under an obligation to boycott either party to the dispute. Indeed, we are not disposed to maintain that the obligation of boycott ever obtains, except in case of scandalous exploitation of labor. We suspended publication for the simple reason that we could not find in the whole city a single concern employing union labor that could do our work. Now we have found one. It has accepted the demand for a forty-four hour week and is ready to advance wages by fourteen dollars a week or by whatever other figure is fixed in the settlement that must come sooner or later. It is operating on the principle of continuing with production while the negotiations for a settlement drag on—a principle which, if more widely adopted, might temper the passionate technicalities of the dispute with moderation and common sense.

The New
REPUBLIC
A Journal of Opinion

PUBLISHED WEEKLY AND COPYRIGHT, 1919, IN THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA BY THE REPUBLIC PUBLISHING COMPANY, INC., 421 WEST TWENTY-FIRST ST., NEW YORK, N. Y. HERBERT CROLY, PRES.; ROBERT HALLOWELL, TREAS.

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YEARLY SUBSCRIPTION FIFTY-TWO ISSUES, FIVE DOLLARS IN ADVANCE. SINGLE COPIES FIFTEEN CENTS. CANADIAN SUBSCRIPTIONS, FIVE DOLLARS AND FIFTY CENTS PER YEAR IN ADVANCE. FOREIGN SUBSCRIPTIONS FOR COUNTRIES IN THE POSTAL UNION, SIX DOLLARS PER YEAR IN ADVANCE; REMITTANCE TO BE MADE BY INTERNATIONAL POSTAL MONEY ORDER.

ENTERED AS SECOND CLASS MATTER, NOVEMBER 6, 1914, AT THE POST OFFICE AT NEW YORK, N. Y., UNDER THE ACT OF MARCH 3, 1879.

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Unrest

THOSE who recall the volume of words uttered in the last few years about unpreparedness will recognize the original cause of our present difficulties. For one year we have tried to drift somehow back to some kind of peace footing. Instead we have drifted into a severe internal conflict. We are paying the price today for the complacency of having said on December second a year ago that the return to peace "promises to outrun any inquiry that may be instituted and any aid that may be offered. It will not be easy to direct it any better than it will direct itself." In these last months it has directed itself to the edge of disaster.

This was not accomplished by the comparatively insignificant people who wish to overthrow the government. It was accomplished by the office holders who have been too absent-minded to behave like a government. They have refused to look ahead, refused to think, refused to plan, refused to prepare for any of the normal consequences of a war. The attack on the government is nothing as compared with the paralysis of the government. Can anyone name a single piece of constructive legislation or administration carried through since the armistice? Railroads, shipping, prices, import and export policy, our financial relations with Europe, not one of them has been dealt with. To the problem of capital and labor, aggravated by the price convulsion and by the nervous fatigue of the war, what has been the constructive contribution of the government? A hall to meet in and a chairman.

Compared to those of any other nation our difficulties were small. But they were difficulties, and they required action and policy and leadership. There has been none. For the government of the United States resides in the mind of Mr. Wilson. There are no other centers of decision. Whatever thinking is done he does. If he is away the thinking apparatus is away. Because for the last year he found himself more than occupied with the treaty of peace, there has been no government at home able or willing to deal with those things that we have neglected at our peril. For this neglect a most fantastic excuse has been put forward. It is that nothing could be done until the treaty of peace was ratified.

It is pointed out that labor's productivity is low. It remains to be pointed out that the productivity of the government in respect to leadership is lower still. There has been no example from Washington to inspire hard work, prevision or prudence. The assumption has been that fate or luck would take care of us, as it did the babes in the woods. There has been no program on which men could loyally unite, no line of policy defined which they could follow, no purposes set before them to which they could apply their energies. It has been an abdication of leadership. In great matters it has been a year of waiting around. At first this was a relief after the intense strain of the war, but gradually as the results of neglect made themselves felt a panic has spread.

It has infected most seriously a large number of the established leaders of the community. They are in danger of losing their heads for they are enormously frightened. Worst of all they show that they are frightened. They are doing just what leaders must never under any circumstances do: betraying their own lack of confidence. In real life, as well as in fiction, the greater the peril the cooler and more collected the leader must be. Who ever trusted a man when he twittered and chattered? While others tremble, he stands firm, unhurried, imperturbable! If for a disastrous moment he begins to wring his hands, to cry out, see spooks, to curse and pray, adieu to his leadership for the stampede and the rout are on.

The Chief Hallucination

The cold shiver which is passing down the backs of so many is produced chiefly at Helsingfors, Stockholm, Copenhagen, and in the close vicinity of City Hall Park. In manufacturing costs it is probably the world's most expensive shiver. Historically it is the sequel to the nightmares experienced by those who expected to hear at almost any moment that the German army had landed in New York, who saw a spy in every nurse girl and sedition in every brogue. The same people who suffered such horrors as those all through the war are now daily in the presence of imaginary soviets, dictatorships, confiscation decrees, and above all extraordinary tribunals. In their mind's eye, and this is essential to a charitable understanding of the case, they are already experiencing a sally from the tenements, followed by confiscation, the brutal dictatorship of an ignorant and alien horde, and the whole catalogue of social pestilence. In the worst cases the thing has all the vividness of an hallucination. For most of our leading citizens it is sufficiently real to have unstrung what was left to unstring after the war had finished with their nerves. Naturally it is difficult for them to understand those who are trying to retain composure without complacency. It seems as

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if only an incendiary could be calm when there is a fire. But that is just where bad nerves are leading them astray. The incendiary, they may be sure, is in a state of fluttering excitement. The person who remains calm, if he is fit for his job, is the fireman.

Our leaders should remember that they have no monopoly of bad nerves, and that the example set by those who are conspicuous has enormous effect on the rest of the population. What example do they set? Are they devoted to the truth? Do they insist, as leaders should insist, on the authentic news? Do they squelch rumor and gossip and legend? They repeat them at every dinner table. Do they withhold judgment till the evidence is in? Do they judge as they would be judged? They do not. They condemn sight unseen, text unread, on hearsay. Before they can expect a restoration of order in society there will have to be a restoration of order in the minds of those who are its leading citizens. Let them allay their own unrest first. So long as they go into delirium at imaginary pictures of the Russian Revolution, it will not be surprising that "ignorant foreigners" are excited when they find that the old wages will not buy the same groceries. Let our leaders put aside this opera bouffe revolution with themselves cast for Marie Antoinette. Let history make its legends if it must. But let us stop living in a legend. Life today is grim and difficult enough without complicating it further by behaving as if it were half melodrama, half nightmare.

The Bogus Revolution

The most dangerous form of complication is the current fashion of treating almost every economic or political incident as a phase of an imaginary revolution. For the moment the universal question is not whether this is right or wrong, desirable or undesirable, wise or foolish, but whether it fits in with this fictitious revolution that so many pretend is in progress. All our judgments are disturbed by this unreal criterion, and we shall not have restored sense until we begin again to deal with things on their merits, according to the facts, in the light of the sane tradition of American life. If everything that is suggested in America is to be viewed in the light of what Lenin thinks and does or is supposed to think and do, we shall never recover our self-possession. Take the case of a lawyer with years of experience in railroads who after long study evolves a railroad bill to untangle the railroad question. He proposes to compensate the owners at a price fixed by the courts. He proposes to win, if at all, by persuasion, perhaps in the last resort by a direct appeal to the voter. There surely is a proposal to be examined entirely on its merits. His plan may be wrong in principle or detail. It may be a mistake as the Payne-Aldrich tariff was a mistake. But it is not a massacre. Yet the scheme is treated by many who should know better as if it were the Russian Revolution at last arrived on our soil.

America, Bull Moose

The time has come when those who lead opinion will have to make up their minds what they propose to regard as revolutionary. That the overwhelming majority in this country is against revolution is not open to question. But at the same time, in spite of all appearances, a decisive majority is progressive to radical. That which in 1912 went to the making of liberalism in all parties but the Republican rump and the bourbon Democracy is not extinguished and cannot long be frustrated. It swung the election of 1916 for Wilson, and it is abroad today. As a party the Bull Moose is dead, as a way of behaving it will not down. For it represents the persistent dream of all Americans, that whatever Europe's experience may be, here at least obstinacy and fanaticism shall not have their way; here at least citizenship shall overpower class.

A spirit more unrevolutionary is not conceivable. There is place in the scheme of class war and revolution for Mr. Gary and Mr. Haywood. Both gentlemen are cut to specification. Both behave exactly as Capitalist and Proletarian are pictured in the socialist books of prophecy. I say there is place in the revolutionary scheme for Mr. Gary and Mr. Haywood. But there is no place for the Theodore Roosevelt of 1912 or the Woodrow Wilson of the fourteen points. Those two leaders in those two episodes in our recent history mark the zenith of American effort to rise entirely above and beyond the plane where the class war is fought, above and beyond the assumptions, the emotions, and the terms of that struggle. This effort is the enduring part of the American ideal. It recurs again and again, this sense that our game shall not be played under the European rules, that somehow by force of will and contagious hope the whole business will be lifted above the categories of class. In the days of free land and open opportunity the ideal grew naturally on this soil. It was just exactly what pioneers would believe who felt enormous open spaces around them. For class war is a doctrine of congestion, of crowded cities or preempted land. Today in America the memory of that old physical freedom appears in the midst of a massive industrialism. It is fighting a desperate battle for the survival of the American impulse against accepting class war as the order of our life.

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Grotesques

How does it happen, then, that our leading citizens should confuse the American liberal with the pacifist, the pro-German, and the Bolshevik? So far as this confusion exists in ignorant minds the explanation is easy. There have been numerous occasions when liberals have had the thankless task of defending this unpopular trinity, and undiscriminating people who have only the formulae and not the spirit of the American faith simply cannot comprehend the attitude of anybody who is willing to defend the rights of those with whom he disagrees. Pacifists have rights which it was necessary to defend against the mob spirit and against the fanatical zeal of officeholders. The German nation had certain contractual rights under the armistice which conscience and wisdom required us to honor. The Russian civil war was not a thing for Americans to incite or sustain; blockading people with whom we were not at war was indecent, invading their country without a declaration of war was too much like what we deplored in the Germans. Only a fool or a knave would ever confuse these convictions with pacifism, pro-Germanism, Bolshevism. But so thoroughly confused are they that the universities, the United States Congress, the government departments, every newspaper office is stocked with men who are in mortal terror of those terrible epithets. They tip-toe by day and quake by night, because they know that at this moment the man who in domestic policy stands about where Theodore Roosevelt stood in 1912 and in foreign affairs where Woodrow Wilson stood when he first landed in Paris, and in his doctrine of toleration where John Milton stood two and a half centuries ago, is certain, absolutely certain to be called pacifist, pro-German, and Bolshevist. It cannot be helped.

For the very essence of any sincere belief in the liberty promised by the First Amendment is a willingness to defend the liberty of opinions with which you disagree. That means protecting some pretty poor opinions, ignorant, wild and mean opinions, occasionally even sinister ones. What is it that induces any American to take upon himself the thankless task of saying things which at first glance are sure to sound pacifist, pro-German, or Bolshevist though he himself is none of these things? There are pleasanter occupations. There are less costly occupations. There are more thrilling occupations. There are more soothing ones. Think about it a minute. A man in New York City who speaks no Russian, has no relatives or friends in Russia, is well fed, warm, comfortable, hopes that the Bolsheviks will be supplanted, is at heart an almost pedantic believer in orderly and continuous procedure, finding himself in agreement with Mr. Lloyd George and General Smuts, gets up and says that the starvation of Russia should stop, that Russian babies, and Russian mothers should have food, that the hospitals should have anaesthetics and surgical supplies. Those words cost him the black looks of some of his acquaintances. But he keeps on saying it though old friendships are strained, and he notices that some draw away from him, and that Mrs. So and So has begun to chatter to Mrs. Somebody else. He keeps on, if he is any good, though pretty soon he finds himself figuring as a friend and disciple of Lenin. I can't imagine a less productive enterprise, measured by the standards of this world.

To see in him a conspiracy, a sedition, or disloyalty or any of the other noisy epithets so easily employed is to forget most of what history teaches. It is to forget that from Louis XVI to Nicholas II the confusion between constitutional reform and violent revolution has been the true source of revolution. Everybody who ever paused to think knows that to be the truth. It has been preached so long that we have almost forgotten its importance. It has been practiced by every statesman who ever steered a people through a crisis. The rule that reform is the antidote to revolution comes as near as any rule can be in politics to being a universal rule. It is no new discovery. It is no one's sudden bright idea. It is not a paradox invented by the intellectuals, the intelligentsia or the parlor Bolsheviks. It is old wisdom, but in high places it has been forgotten. The established leaders are once again flying in the face of all experience by treating every substantial reform as the prelude to and not the preventive of revolution.

This has led to grotesque performances which can be grouped under one heading, as the tendency to see a conspiracy when there is none. Conspiracies occur occasionally, but they are never harder to detect than when they are conceived to be everywhere. Yet playing Sherlock Holmes has its fascination even for the adult mind, especially in wartime when those who are denied a part in the great adventure are almost irresistibly impelled to imagine adventures in which they have a leading role. The more ludicrous phases of the spy mania originated there. I am thinking of the kindly ladies who turned German nurse girls into the streets so that these girls should not be able to communicate the important military secrets which were the property of their households. Instead of serving their country by keeping the nurse girls safely interned in the nursery, it seemed more romantic to pretend that they might learn something of interest to the German General Staff. I have sometimes thought how

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severely these ladies would have disapproved the policy of the military authorities in France who ordered German prisoners to wear German uniforms. For if certain of our more excited and hysterical had been running the war they would surely have insisted on stripping the prisoners of the pro-German field-grey and upon clothing the Huns in horizon blue or khaki. They would have called that stamping out pro-Germanism. No wonder Bolo Pasha fooled so many of them. He did not talk like a pro-German, and he consorted with our leading citizens. They could not remember that the real spy and the real traitor would avow himself a two hundred per cent American. The man who in wartime states any opinion different from that which prevails may be a fool or a nuisance if you like, but for conspiracy and treason he is ipso facto impossible.

Yet some very active people seem heroically determined to forget this. Recently, for example, in New York City the Lusk Committee, figuratively preceded by a brass band and actually accompanied by a platoon of infantry, raided the so-called Soviet Mission in New York. The Committee found nothing; only an absolute booby would have expected to find anything. Russians are pretty good conspirators, for all of them went to school under the Tsar. Now if you are conducting a conspiracy you do not carry it on from an office building after you have advertised the address in all the newspapers and invited everybody to come and call and do business. That would not be the ideal headquarters for a secret conspiracy. Such an office might be a blind (I am not for a moment implying that it is), but it is certain as daylight that no trace of conspiracy would be found at such an office. A schoolboy with no more detective skill than can be acquired from reading detective novels could have told Mr. Lusk and Mr. Stevenson that.

Finally, and this is the most critical of the preliminaries to a restoration of common sense, the leaders of the community should mitigate the habit of wrapping themselves in the American flag. It offends most patriots when a chorus girl appears in red and white tights and a star-spangled corsage and vociferates about the land of liberty. It is just as vulgar and just as offensive for men to dress up luridly when they are urging their views of public policy. Americanism is cheapened and debased when it is put forth as the compelling reason for somebody's notion about military legislation, industrial control, or foreign policy. People who flaunt Americanism on all occasions do not inspire respect, and if the aristocratic virtues are to be preserved even in the most democratic society, the huckster and the shyster must be rigorously suppressed, most particularly among those to whom the community is told to look for light and leading. Our most prominent citizens cannot afford to display too much bad taste. It is a cheap soul that is continually braying about the eternal verities. For thou shalt not take the name of the Lord thy God in vain.

Some Recent Experience

The panic which afflicts us is directly traceable to the absence of a policy which would organize the nation for work, and the lack of authentic information which would organize its emotion in contact with a vast and overpowering experience. Consider what we have been through: Period I. Be neutral in fact as well as in name. Period II. Fight like thunder to make the world safe for democracy. Period III. Stop before your anger is exhausted and spend the better part of a year standing around undecided while peace is made for you in secret. Some months of supreme, but unfinished concentration enclosed by two periods of vacillation and drift. During that whole time of exhausting strain and still more exhausting idleness, most people were dealing with facts that they had to imagine because they did not see them. No nation, I suppose, ever fought a great war on so abstract a basis, except of course the Canadians, the Australians and the New Zealanders. The Hun was not at our gate, even as he was at England's. The whole conflict was far away, and the troops who went forth sailed into the dusk of the censorship. The American at home could know the European war only as he was told about it: he had no vivid personal encounter with it himself unless he invented one in the person of a German bartender or music teacher. Now what Americans could learn about Europe was subject to two conditions: First the censor came along, and with one blow of his axe abolished all possibility of telling the unprejudiced and unvarnished truth. Either the news gave information to the enemy, or it hurt morale, and for one or the other of those two reasons almost anything could be suppressed. So the censor made the news vacuum; then the propagandist filled it. The assumption underlying practically all propaganda was that the citizens of the Allied countries were on the verge of being pacifists, pro-Germans, and later Bolsheviks. The second assumption was that the only morale capable of standing the strain of war was built upon frightfulness. It was for this reason that a vast machine extending all over the world was constructed to keep constantly before the minds of people that particular selection of atrocities which it was believed would keep up their morale. For five years we have learned about the world what government

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officials had decided they wished us to know. Our leading citizens did not escape it. They are saturated with propaganda like the rest, and twenty years from now they will wonder how they ever could have believed some of the things they took for granted in 1919 A. D.

A time when all information is what the Europeans call tendencious, when the people are alternately let down, frustrated, screwed up, frustrated, and let down is one in which realistic judgment is difficult. In the meantime the world having been harrowed its length and breadth, the sense of uncertainty, of strange complexity, of lurking danger pervades a community. And thus the nation finds itself in the face of aggravated problems without any source of information that it can really trust, and without leaders to interpret events. Of course people become restless and uncertain, and highly sensitive to moral epidemics. The one thing, the only thing that could stabilize men's mind in the gigantic flux and shift of the present world, is trustworthy news, unadulterated data, fair reporting, disinterested fact. "Your eyes were unlidded, your ears were unstopped."

In some measure our leading citizens are so extremely credulous because they are so perplexed. They hesitate to move because they cannot foresee the consequences, because everything is too uncertain. They have been fooled time without number. But while they wait, while the men who have the power to lead a reconstruction worthy of our pride and our ideals hesitate in uncertainty, the meaner elements whisper in their ear and break their nerve. This whispering has for its ostensible purpose the downing of pro-Germans and Bolsheviks. The actual result has been to scare well-to-do people so completely out of their wits that they are temporarily incapable of listening to reason.

The Higher Unrest

The most dangerous form of unrest at this moment is that which prevails among the leaders of the community, among those who exercise the force of the state and set the temper of debate. The basis of revolution does not now exist in America. But the possibility of great disorder we have always with us. Mobs form rather easily, and rather easily get out of hand; and being a high strung people rather than a phlegmatic one, there is considerable commotion when the mob goes on the loose. The real peril as distinguished from the bogey is that the difficult readjustments just ahead of us will be accompanied by a nerve wracking and distracting disorder. Revolution there will not be, but a great deal of rioting there may be. A fly alighting on the nose of a philosopher could disturb his profoundest thoughts, said Pascal. A riot, though only a few shins are bruised, will pretty nearly always dissipate the constructive mood of a community. For disorder captures attention, arouses pugnacity and fear, infuriates dogma; disorder is the environment in which the demagogue and the jingo are selected, and the reform which both preserves and enriches is lost. There is instead a turmoil of bitterness, which can have no result except to scotch reform until at last the basis of revolution has been laid. The appalling thing at this moment in America is that so many of our leading citizens are in a state of mind to do those things which cannot but provoke chronic and fanatical disorder.

It is an open secret, for example, that many powerful business men have been saying for months that there was needed a "show down" with labor. It was commonly said before the steel strike that Mr. Gary was ready and it would be an excellent opportunity to smash the overweening pretensions of the A. F. of L. The management of the steel strike has been, so far as the employers are concerned, in the hands of men who have sought a fight to the finish, not with the I. W. W., but with the A. F. of L. For as every competent observer has realized the thing which is most at stake is the relation of the A. F. of L. to the American labor movement. The much advertised Mr. Foster symbolizes the issue.

If a constitutional regime is established in industry under which organized labor is given a genuine share in management, the break with the I. W. W. temptation will probably be final. But if the hope of such a regime is finally closed by Mr. Gary's triumph, if in other words the A. F. of L. is driven out of the partnership which it won and earned during the war, then only by a miracle of leadership can a secret drift towards the I. W. W. be averted. How could it be otherwise? It would be perfectly clear to a very large number of workingmen all over the country that the A. F. of L. had been beaten at the most critical point in the most decisive conflict. For while Mr. Gompers owns a Distinguished Service Medal presented by the United States Government, he cannot induce Mr. Gary to answer his letters.

The rank and file of labor is betwixt and between, in doubt as to what leadership to follow. The amazing thing is that a certain number of powerful and responsible people should be willing at such a moment to take the risk of destroying the prestige and effectiveness of the most conservative trade union body in the whole civilized world. In the steel strike, on the floor of the President's Industrial Conference, above all in the newspapers, no single

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thing has been left undone which would weaken the leadership of Mr. Gompers. In a cloud of feverish talk about Bolshevism, a group of leading citizens professing to represent the practical, conservative, far-sighted American business man, has aimed what was intended as a fatal blow at the one labor organization which throughout the world stands as the symbol of anti-Bolshevist labor.

Gamblers

If Mr. Gary's group did not comprise the bold men of a frightened flock, they would never have been permitted to gamble so recklessly. The recklessness does not consist in the fact that they disagree with labor unionists. Far from it. From the point of view of efficient production and sound social policy, the average leadership in American trade unions is by no means what it might be. It is bound to reactionary dogma and split by petty jealousies, it is often badly disciplined; the psychology of the Tammany politicians pervades some of the officialdom. The record of organized labor in respect to scientific management is understandable but it indicates no high order of leadership. Nor has its record in American politics been anything to boast of. On specific questions of wages and hours, of shop control, or even on that of the jurisdiction of collective barganining there must be serious differences of opinion, for the capitalist and the manager are in contact with phases of industry that do not enter the calculations of the wage earner. There is no recklessness in disagreeing with organized labor. The recklessness of Garyism consists in denying the very existence of organized labor. Actually Mr. Gompers may have walked out of the room, and the employers may have remained in it. Technically he bolted. But what had actually happened was that the employers had voted that he represented nobody. It is as if the Republicans in the Senate should vote a resolution saying that they would not recognize the credentials of the Democrats. There would be no Senate after that vote. Likewise there was no conference. Sam Gompers might still have sat in that hall, but President Samuel Gompers of the American Federation of Labor had been voted out of existence.

It is a pregnant moment in American history. For the first time the whole of organized labor and the leading group of capital have defined an issue which makes their differences a matter of kind, and not simply of degree. No formula however ingenious can any longer conceal the existence of two irreconcilable dogmas. The easy thing to do is to let one's sympathy decide between them, to throw in our lot with Gomperism or Garyism. And once our prejudice is dominant, it is simple to find evidence and reason to sustain it. But we dare not do that. We dare not allow the leaders of a class to present the American people with a dilemma, and we dare not allow ourselves to regard a conflict as fatally determined.

An Ultimate Faith

The idea that there is a Public Group, that it is the guardian of the Public Thing, that somehow it manages to represent the disinterested thought of the community—this idea persists in the American tradition. The skeptics jeer at it as a pure fiction, and the sinister often use it as a masquerade. But if it did not exist we should have to invent it. No class of people enumerated in the census are the "Public." But all individuals at some time or other are part of it. They are part of it whenever they are individuals and not mere conscious or unconscious members of a class. The Public is the name of those who in any crisis are seeking the truth and not advocating their dogma. Thus it was altogether right that Mr. Rockefeller should be a member of the Public group at the President's Conference because he was acting on considerations infinitely wider than those with which his name is commonly associated. But it was absurd to put Mr. Gary in the Public group because for him the issues of the conference were an incident in the labor policy of his corporation. The idea of a Public is simply a short way of expressing the great faith that a group of men and women will always disentangle themselves from their prejudices and will be sufficiently powerful to summon the partisans before the bar of reason; and that evidence, not mere jaw, will then decide.

In the lean and bitter time which may be ahead of us we shall find our way through if we are loyal to this ideal. Each of us will have to make some sacrifice of personal comfort and of ambition. But the supreme sacrifice demanded will be the sacrifice of dogma, the yielding of that worst form of pride, the pride of opinion. We shall have to yield our pride, and not merely insist that our opponent yield his. We shall have to put veracity above vehemence, and a willingness to seek the truth above the luxury of bawling the other fellow out. Recently it was said that the amalgam is running out of civilization. If that is even partially true, it is because we have in a moment of great perplexity stood upon the arrogance of opinion. It will be well for us to remember what Montaigne wrote, in the days when Europe was wracked by religious wars and by persecutions: 'After all, it is setting a high value upon

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our opinions, to roast men alive on account of them.'

Without a disentangled Public the unending clash of Ins and Outs, Haves and Have Nots, Reds and Whites is likely to be sheer commotion. No doubt there is much that is insincere and much that is maudlin said about the Public. The news system of the world being what it is, and education being where it is, it is possible to fool most of the Public a good part of the time. The Public is one of those ideals, if you like, which we miss oftener than we attain. But it is a precious ideal. It is the only way we have of formulating our belief that reason is the final test of action, that mere push and pull are not by themselves to set the issues and to render the decision.

As I look at it, any person is part of the Public when he is dealing with party, sect or class, not as their attorney, not as their opponent, not as their censor or their laureate, but as one seeking to learn from them, to discover in them, to draw out of them, and propose to them plans which employ in their most productive and harmonious form the energies of men. His temptation and constant danger is that he will be sucked into each controversy as it comes along, compelled to fight not for those things which he believes in most but on behalf of that party which he fears least. He tends to be swept out of a public into a partisan position chiefly because when presented with an alternative, the contagion of debate seizes him, and his mind becomes infertile. Especially if things are bitter, it is difficult to maintain enough composure for the invention of those great expedients which dissipate a struggle by repolarizing the energies involved. It is necessary but it is difficult to recall Emerson's advice that "when classes are exasperated against each other, the peace of the world is always kept by striking a new note."

The Public at the Conference

This is ilustrated by the Industrial Conference. The hope of that gathering lay in the Public group and in the Administration as representative of the Public. It was perfectly well known in advance that the unions on one side and the employees who accepted Mr. Gary as leader were locked in a decisive battle to decide the fate of unionism itself. Both groups were obsessed by the issue. The Public group, on the other hand, drifted into Washington unprepared and unled, without conviction and without plan, and with no resource except the attempt to supply ambiguous formulae as compromises for clean-cut differences. Capital and Labor were narrowly but completely concentrated; the Public mind on the contrary was distracted and almost vacant.

Consequently, two dogmas were permitted to occupy the whole conference and to wreck it. Now those two dogmas, are very important, but taken by themselves, they are insoluble except by force. I say "taken by themselves," as a question of "I will" and "I won't" or "You must" and "You shan't," they can result only in bicker and scuffle. So *stated,* and that is the only way they were stated, they are not the industrial problem, but simply two sets of pugnacities that have grown like parasites within the industrial problem.

And so men who had come together to prepare for somehing that might be called peace should have insisted on keeping this issue out of the forefront of the discussion. Not in order to evade Garyism, for it cannot be evaded, but in order to dissolve its stony simplicity. There were possibly two ways of dealing with the matter, in view of the fact that Mr. Gary had laid down the assumption of an antagonism to and not a partnership with organized labor. The most statesmanlike would have been to convene the conference on the basis of the labor provisions of the Treaty of Peace, and to make acceptance of those provision the test of membership. This would have been to assume what no publicly-minded person any longer disputes. It would have meant that the Administration had supplied a leader and not merely a chairman. And if the fact that the Treaty was not yet ratified was embarrassing to the Administration, the Treaty itself need not have been cited. The real obstacle to such a policy lay in the unfortunate fact that Mr. Gary rather than someone like Mr. Rockefeller is leading the employers of the country. I am told that Mr. Gary would probably have declined an invitation by the President based on terms which acknowledged as one of the rights of labor what the nations of Europe now at war with Bolshevism have accepted as a minimum. And if Mr. Gary had declined to come, the most unmanageable element of the employers, and temporarily the most powerful element as well, would have been out of the conference.

Under the circumstances the only other course for the Public group was to postpone Garyism to a later stage. This is just what President Eliot sought to do. Roughly speaking industrial relations divide into a question of wages, hours, conditions, and a question of power and efficiency. the stock argument against admitting Labor to a share of power is that it destroys efficiency. But the exclusion of Labor from participation in power, for which essentially Garyism stands, is also notoriously inimical to efficiency. What the conference could

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have done without constituting itself an arbiter in any pending dispute was to undertake an analysis of the whole question of power and efficiency. This problem, although vital, is not as a matter of fact in the foreground. What is of greatest concern to the rank and file is the relation of wages to prices.

That background is not known. There are haphazard guesses and some estimates and much anecdote as to what has happened to the real wages of workingmen since the outbreak of the war. A comprehensive trustworthy study does not exist, though each of us knows from his own experience that there has been a veritable convulsion in the meaning of money. It is very difficult for anybody to calculate on the basis of a fifty cent dollar, and when men's expectations go astray the thing called unrest exists. But it so happens that the Public group was in such a hurry "to get things done" that it completely neglected to organize the kind of price and wage and standard of living inquiry which would have made possible a perspective on the unrest. Instead of starting with a disinterested appeal to the facts which underlie the whole dispute, facts which are neutral to the contentions of Mr. Gary and Mr. Gompers, the Public group let the contentions have the floor. It tried to be umpire not analyst and inventor; and what it organized was a debate not an inquiry.

The method of inquiry before decision or debate would have had some opposition from labor. Garyism is so terrible a threat to the unions that they are bound to grapple with it on every occasion. Nevertheless, a clear demonstration to working men that the conference was primarily concerned with that which most harasses them; that the conference was dealing with concrete matters and not with Mr. Gary's dogmas, might have permitted Mr. Gompers to avoid his sensational exit. For in the light of the facts as to prices and wages the whole industrial problem takes on a cooler and more manageable aspect.

It ceases to be a thriller about plots and secretly drilling armies and dark red foreigners. Then if men doing essential work in society ask for a reconsideration of their wage schedules on the ground that their wages have risen only 37½% in seven and a half years the thing to do is to find out whether their facts are correct and then to transact business with them on the basis of the known facts about the cost of living. To shriek soviet and publish ethnic data about the number of Austro-Hungarians among them, when most of these alien-enemies derive from our recently liberated Allies is of a piece with the plastering of Mr. Margolis's opinions all over the front pages and the relegating of Mr. Royal Meeker's data somewhere to the region of the millinery advertisements.

In the End

For a reduction of this panic my own hopes are in what might be called the latent public, in that community, shifting more or less from day to day, of those whose attitude defies classification, who do not run true to class because in their own way and with all their limitations they are looking for the truth. Intolerance may submerge them for a time and timidity paralyze them and conformity subdue them. They are there. They can be summoned. They will arise and assert the supremacy of confidence over fear, of reason and charity over suspicion and hysteria. They will prevail and restore the good humor of America when enough men, realizing the drifting embitterment of our life, break loose from their calculations and shout: Damn your Bolshevism, the time for chatter has passed. There is work to do.

WALTER LIPPMANN.

Dawn

This morning
I saw the first grey streak across the east;
Saw it deepen, till the gates of Paradise
Stood wide—
Then, from the waving grass,
The mocking bird's wild song
Rose on the morning wind
Until I called to him:—
O mocking bird!
Shall I one day sing
Touch burning breast to cool deep grass
Sing on the morning wind?

AGNES CORNELL.

Mother of Quiet

Quiet clings to her tread like sandals,
Her vestment moves with no sound,
Wheresoever she walks, there
Is holy ground.

Her fragrant body is a soft fire
Burning honey and wheat;
I shut out tumult, hearing
Her still feet.

I would be as the moss, a depth
Under her step, for she,
Touching my restless heart,
Would hallow me.

JOSEPH AUSLANDER.

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What the Miners Are Thinking

WHY do the miners think that the war is over and that their war-time agreement with the Government is over and that their war-time anti-strike along with it?

Why do they think that they are right in demanding "negotiation"—for the new scale of wages and hours—and in resolutely refusing "arbitration"?

Why do they think that a six-hour day and a five-day week is a reasonable idea as a first proposal, as an "asking price," in the start of "negotiation"?

Why do they think that the Government is now in effect helping every international red radical in the coal-mines of America to persuade his fellow-workers that the war with Germany was used by the employers and by the Government to catch the miners in the trap of patriotism?

Why do they think such things? Perhaps they think some of them erroneously. Perhaps they think some of them madly. The madness of 400,000 citizens is quite important. Why are they so mad? The Surgeon General, if not the Secretary of Labor, might have tried to tell us. Instead, we are left to find out for ourselves.

We cannot find out from the mere public statements of officers of the United Mine Workers. Those officers are very technical. They have to be. For years their occupation has been to conduct technical discussions of technical trade points in private conferences with the representatives of organized associations of employers. They are not haranguers of the public. They are at a disadvantage at that point with certain Senators and Congressmen. They are not trained too much to be demagogues. For their present purposes they are trained too much to be diplomats. They often use a trade language and—like diplomats—assume it to be the language of the human race; and they often—like diplomats—omit the emotional background of their formal declarations of war, or of peace.

They declare, for instance, that they are willing, and have always been willing, and eager, to "negotiate without reservations." What do they mean? From their private conversations it is clear that they mean something technical but also something more than technical. By "negotiate" they mean that they insist on continuing to settle their affairs in the coal-mining industry through direct dealings with the employers in that industry; but they also mean that they have reason profoundly to distrust all "boards of arbitration" appointed by "neutrals" and umpired by "impartial persons." Why? And by "without reservations" they mean that they are willing to lay all their demands about wages and all their demands about hours unreservedly on the table of "negotiation" for all informed discussion and for all suggested compromise; but they also mean that they unreservedly retain the right to strike and that not for one minute—any longer—do they see any reason for confiding their fate and the fate of their followers to simply "our common Americanism." But why?

Why do they distrust "neutrals" and "impartial persons"? And why, in facing their employers, do they think that "our common Americanism" is an insufficient weapon?

Even in their private conversations they do not answer with all the fullness which the case would hold. The case would hold a theory. It would hold the theory of the class-war. They stay away from that theory. They are very American themselves. They are very patriotic. They expel a man from their organization if they find him joining that revolutionary organization, the Industrial Workers of the World; they recently suspended a whole district of unions in their organization because its officials joined that revolutionary organization, the One Big Union. But, without theories, they are rasped—they are rasped raw—by the facts.

The President is a "neutral." The Fuel Administrator is a "neutral." His colleagues in all the executive departments, executing the will of no class but of all classes, are "neutrals." Senators and Congressmen are "neutrals." By the class-less spirit of our institutions, they are sworn to neutrality and impartiality. Executive officers, legislative officers, of the Government of the United States—they are our highest legal and moral reach in the production of "neutrals" and "impartial persons." The miners reject the theory of the class-struggle. But can they accept the theory of the class-less state?

A year ago this month these "neutrals" and "impartial persons" at Washington had three controls over the coal operators. They destroyed all three of them. They destroyed the fixing of prices by the Fuel Administrator. They destroyed the allocating of the coal itself—to consumers—through priority orders—by the War Industries Board. They destroyed the collecting of coal-digging costs by the Federal Trade Commission. They destroyed them in obedience to the principle announced by the supreme "neutral"—the President. It was he who said that the war had come to an end and that it

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was our national wisdom to take the "harness off business.

It was taken speedily off the business of the coal operators. They ceased months ago to be checked in raising their scale of charges; and they have raised it wherever they could. They ceased months ago to ship their coal to consumers determined by a calculation of public interest and of prior moral right; and they willingly resumed shipping it to consumers determined by the most dollars and the highest bids. They ceased months ago to report their costs and their prices to the Federal Trade Commission; and at once their profits from an industry passed into the private dark.

The President had declared the executive will. Congress even exceeded it. When the Federal Commission, for instance, was zealous to continue its collecting of costs, in basic industries, Congress turned a negative face on Mr. Colver. Not only should the coal operators not be driven in any "harness," but no record should be kept of even where they were going, by any trailed tracks. The Republican Congress, the Democratic Administration, were agreed. They concurred in telling the coal operators that the war was over and the lid off.

Now, when they tell the miners that the war is on and the lid down, they convince the miners of just one thing. They convince them that "neutrals" and "impartial persons" do not dominantly exist in the Government of the United States *in respect of the coal industry*.

The representatives of the United Mine Workers at Washington seem to draw no other conclusion. They seem to draw no general conclusion. They draw only a particular conclusion. *In respect of the coal industry* the Government of the United States has declared one sort of war for the employers and another sort of war for the employees.

The answers then to the first two questions at the top of this article are the same answer. The miners think that the war is over because the Government emphatically said it was over for the operators; and they think that they are right in rejecting "arbitration" because the "arbitration" would be arranged, and the umpires in the "arbitration board" would be appointed, by a governmental system of things which (*in respect of the coal industry*) has sufficiently and scandalously shown that it is not "neutral" and not "impartial." "Arbitration," as a proposition thinkably palatable to the miners, was struck dead when the Government, having granted full peace-time shore-leave to the operators, revealed its un-American class-consciousness by trying to order the miners below-deck to get up full-steam to meet the Teuton enemy.

But the Washington representatives of the United Mine Workers would not call it "class-consciousness." They call it a "mistake." Their loyalty to the American theory of class-less government seems to be absolute. I venture to interpolate my compliments to them. Their view seems to be that the American Government is a class-less government, somewhat led astray, particularly in respect of the coal industry. It has nothing much to do—this view—with logic. It has a lot to do with creative evolution—in America.

It gives the miners a position from which—if they would—they could declare themselves the champions of the public, of all classes, for a scientific reorganization of the coal industry and from which they could declare themselves the allies of the public, of all classes, for the electing and maintaining of a government which would enforce that kind of reorganization for the general welfare not only in the vital matter of the coal industry but in certain other basic industries as well. For what is the idea in the thirty-hour week which the miners demand? Why do they think they are right in demanding? They are putting it forward, of course, only as a first proposal, only as an "asking price," that is the technical meaning of the word "demand." Stated exactly, the demand of the miners is that their demand for a thirty-hour week and for a 60 per cent increase in wages shall be accepted by the operators as the miners' starting point in a negotiation for the immediate making of a new scale of hours and wages. But why do they think that such a starting point is reasonable? Because for years and years their employers have trained them to be familiar with many and many weeks of less than thirty hours. Because they are accustomed to a short week. Because this very year there have been multitudes of men working four days, three days, two days, one day, no day, in numerous weeks. Because simultaneously, in numerous weeks, there were other miners elsewhere working full time. Because this uncertainty and irregularity and inhumanly unjust and stupid bad distribution of work has come to be intolerable to them. Because during the war the Government and the operators and the railways made a great improvement in it through control of coal orders and through control of coal shipments and through a policy of even and certain and regular production and distribution. But as soon as the war was over the Government and the operators and the railways at once abandoned all social control of coal and at once sank back into the savagery of chaotic coal orders and chaotic coal shipments and *chaotic work weeks* in a renewed, untamed, private scramble for private profits. Because the miners calculate that if all mines and if all coal mined was used scientifically on the

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grates on which it is burned, the country would have no coal shortage. And, finally, because they knew that unless they come forward with a stringent demand, the operators will continue in the future, just as in the past, to give their employees any work week, a long one or a short one, a full one or a totally empty one, depending entirely on the chances of their own private scramble in a commodity which the President calls a "necessary of life." He enjoined the operators to return to the scramble. The miners now, on their own account, from the bottom, are trying to introduce a certain amount of sanity into that scramble by a stringent demand *having simply to do with the work week.* They may some day lift that demand to a consideration—a political consideration—of the things which are necessary to a regular work week: namely, a regular coal market and a regular car supply. But they are strict trades unionists, the mine workers, they do not talk much of governmental power and help in the ordering of their industry. They talk rather of what they suffered from a too optimistic association with the present Government at Washington during the war. One of them opened his heart in these words:

"Did you need to think it over and to wait for the sinking of the Lusitania before you knew where you were on the war? I didn't. Neither did my two friends here. We knew where we were as soon as Germany was in Belgium. We can prove it. And we can prove that we told our fellows all through the war to dig and dig and dig and get the coal. In the summer of 1918 they came to us and said that they were worse off for food and clothes than before the war began. They said that the operators were getting sure money under the fixed prices and in most cases were getting big money, but that the miners were losing. They were right. Our last raises were in 1917. I come from Indiana.

"Our pick miners used to get 64 cents a ton. In 1917 it was raised to 84. Our machine miners used to get 52. In 1917 it was raised to 72. Three-quarters of our members are pick miners or machine miners. The machine miners' raise amounted to about 40 per cent. The pick miners' raise amounted to about 30 per cent. We have had no raise since. In the fall if 1918 we could prove we were entitled to another raise—and a big one—on the increased cost of living. We went to Mr. Garfield for it. He refused it. Our members came to us demanding it. I can remember just how I spoke to then. They remind me of it now. They rub it into me. I told them that the President could not see his way clear to let us have the raise at that time. I told them that the war must be fought. I told them that the Government was fighting the war. I told them that the Government was a government of everybody and that if they were patient it would do justice to everybody when it could.

"I told them to trust the Government and trust the President and to go on with the war. When the war was over the Government and the President would see to it that we got our rights. They went back to digging. With 80,000 of our fellows away in the army, they dug more coal than in any other year on record. The war ended. The operators refused to negotiate a new scale with us. They refused even to begin any negotiations with us for a new scale. They refuse now to begin any negotiation unless it is accompanied by a possible appeal to an arbitration board. An arbitration board would last all winter. The anthracite arbitration board lasted months. We understand. It is intended to give us another winter of delay. We have waited two winters since our last raise. We will not wait another. When the war was over, the Government owed us something. We could have tied the country up tight in the summer of 1918 when the country had to have coal or lose the war. We could have compelled the country to give us a raise then. We did not use our power. We told the men to keep at work. They kept at work and trusted.

We gave the Government credit. How has it paid? When we approached the operators last September and asked them to negotiate, did the Government even urge them to negotiate? Did the President use any of his power, did the Cabinet use any of its influence, to compel the operators to at least open a negotiation with us for the raise which we surrendered to the war in 1918? Did they? Every fellow who told me they never would, now comes to me and says: 'Did they?' He comes to me and says: 'You officers are a soft lot, you believed in the Government. The Government kidded you. They boobed you, they played you for patriotic suckers. What have you got to say about patriotism now? Any speeches on patriotism this morning?' That is what he says to me. That is what every other fellow with streak of the I. W. W. in him can say to me. I stick for patriotism. But tell me. Do you think I can go out now and tell our members to go back to work in the name of patriotism, in the name of Americanism, in the name of our Government? Washington has double crossed me once. Perhaps a man can be forgiven for being double crossed once. Once. Just once."

That state of mind is the real issue of the strike. That state of mind made the strike. The Government made that state of mind.

WILLIAM HARD.

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After the Play

I.

"One and two and three
Sweet spirits sweeten me . . ."

ONE of the most sacred and visited spots of Japan is the graveyard where Asano is buried with his Ronin about him, each with his lantern-like stone above him. Below in the temple grounds is a treasure house where relics are kept of that three-hundred-year-ago affair—armor, bits of brocade, above all that document in which the Ronin justified their action to the world. The affair has become a symbol of the Japanese ideal of loyalty, the disciplined fanaticism which has shaped, and will continue to shape, her history. One might as well talk about Washington and Valley Forge as an interesting myth of the prehistoric Britons as to say coolly with the program, "In 'The Faithful' John Masefield has retained the original plot of the legend as it first came from the brain of the mysterious author who conceived it B. C. 1338."

But if Masefield's play is robbed of its proper significance by an error of two thousand years in time, the author makes matters worse by a generous injection of Western religion and motivation, blurring the primitive nobility of the original. "Mr. Masefield," said the Japanese gentleman in the next seat, who had been clucking disconsolately, "has mixed things together. In Japan there are ten acts, but it is—it is moving. This is only queer." The introduction of western customs such as hand-shaking and kissing might be forgiven while obviously less artistic—it is the lack of understanding of the psychology of his characters that strikes the discord. In the scene of the blood-letting before the envoy, a taboo was broken. Death followed the sinner like a natural law. Discussion, hesitation and horror upon horror! the youth's "As I would hope to be forgiven myselfing" are impertinences against the grim dignity of the situation. The historical (or, according to the program, legendary!) fact that Kurano discarded a faultless wife as part of his program of revenge seems too harsh, or is it simple? to Mr. Masefield. He makes Lady Kurano indirectly responsible for Asano's death, as though Kurano's loyalty to his dead master were not justification enough for any act necessary to it. He even whitens the devil Kira a bit to harrow the audience more at the climax.

The weakness of the admixture of East and West is intensified by the acting. Rollo Peters as Asano and Henry Herbert as his enemy, the upstart Kira, both attempt with some success (and in the case of Peters, considerable charm) the precision of Japanese acting. If their gestures are still too frequent, their concentration insufficient, one can find no word for the bellowings of the Ronin, the dashings to and fro, the general lack of sustained pictorial sense, so necessary for a successful Japanese play, where no actor moves so much as a hand without premeditation. The gentleman from Japan was bothered by the costumes, or rather the acting inside them. "They are so unbecoming," he said. "The costume goes one way and the man another." He seemed unimpressed by the triptych scenes which I think charming (especially the Hiroshige snow scene), but he admired the room with its mattings and sliding panels and full moon window under the household shrine. Until nearly the end of the play he thought the performance better than that which he had seen in London recently, but with the inexcusable scene between Kira and the Woman, false to Japanese etiquette of both life and art, and the death of the Ronin, hooting like barn owls, his patience gave way entirely. Undoubtedly it would have been better if the Theatre Guild had followed Masefield in making a separate scene at Asano's grave, where they might formally receive the herald and die unhurried, and one may infer, in the silence due them. It is in lack of perception of the continent grandeur of the subject that both Masefield and the Theatre Guild (especially the Theatre Guild) have failed, despite much that is beautiful in the poetry, staging and acting. Like the ten good men, the presentation might have saved the Sodom of Mr. Masefield's Faithful—a living sense of form, an appreciation of the principles at stake, moral and aesthetic, would have covered the defects in the material. As it is, the play is enough unlike Occidental productions to be widely mistaken for Oriental, and one is left wondering whether half a cake (and very good cake) is or is not better than none.

ELIZABETH J. COATSWORTH.

II.

It is sadly clear that the Faithful is pseudo-Japanese. We have not only Miss Coatsworth's just indication of it, but also the audible human testimony of the Japanese gentlemen who go to see the performance. Like Miss Coatsworth I happened to be near some Japanese; and how, in spite of their antique reticence, etc., they publicly made moan. Also they laughed betimes, in their subway. On the whole, though, they enjoyed their pain. They felt not unpleasantly superior, just as I did when I heard the pseudo-Irish brogue at the performance of John Ferguson.

But is the authenticity of The Faithful very important? It is important of course to those who take their Japanese world with them to the theatre and who are bitterly reminded of how much better these things are managed in Japan. To ask the person who knows Japan to forget this crepitus is to ask the impossible. I am only thinking of those who are ignorant, blissfully. Is it important to them that The Faithful is pseudo-Japanese?

I do not think it is very important. Whether Asano's grave is a grave in the actual earth or, like Hamlet's, a grave merely in the imagination, is not significant during the performance of The Faithful. For here, in this performance, is a self-contained world that needs no historical support. What supports it is, perhaps, something no more Japanese in motivation than Julius Caesar was Roman in motivation, or than Antony and Cleopatra was accurate for 30 B. C. But even if the motivation is Western and Christian, there is a great deal that is human in it, especially in the strange and lovely setting of pseudo-Japan.

The performance was at times discordant. Kira and the girl and Kurano and the girl were rather too representational, considering the conventionalized manner generally employed. But I confess that the bellowings of the Ronin did not jar on me. I thought that this handful of actors gave an astonishing sense of multitude, and I thanked heaven that we did not have to see the usual actual congregation of mal-nourished and adenoidal proletarians whose reminder of the capitalistic system comes horribly through their wigs and grease-paint. But these are details. My own sense of The Faithful was one of unimpeded enjoyment. I felt no responsibility for its Japanese-

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ness. I took it as an other-where legend, a legend from the mountains of the moon. And there, as I learned, there were tyrannical priests and sinister upstarts, on one hand, and on the other the valor and fidelity of outcast men. It seemed to me that one clear mood of the heroic was relived by Mr. Masefield, and he gave that mood a singularly dramatic expression. The way in which Kurano put off his wife was made ignoble, and the whole figure of Mr. Duncan was too Sancho Panza-like to carry out the heroic mood. But as against these deficiencies came the sweep of one's sympathy for young valor in the toils of statecraft and for courage and wisdom matched against statecraft to the better end. The play is by far the best that I have seen this season. Mr. Masefield is much too black-and-white to keep to the heart of life. But he is a poet. In The Faithful he looks from Japan into the black pool of tragedy that reflects, not the legend of one country or the legend of another, but the height from which the beholder leans.

F. H.

Half Way House

Heartbreak House, Great Catherine, and Playlets of the War, by Bernard Shaw. New York: Brentano's.

NOW that the war is over, or pretends to be over, our great comic dramatist reappears. Mr. Shaw was practically out of commission during the war. War is not civilized, and comedy, the corrective of civilization, is futile in opposition to war. But with the nominal return of civilization Mr. Shaw is permitted to resume, and he resumes in his old spirit of comedy.

It is interesting, though not surprising, that this new volume of Bernard Shaw's should be so occupied with ladies and gentlemen. I do not refer to the high-up noble people who amuse us in his short plays—Great Catherine, the Inca of Perusalem, Lord Augustus, and Annajanska, the Bolshevik Empress. These short plays were war babies and must not be taken too seriously. I refer to Heartbreak House and the preface that precedes it. This new long work, it need scarcely be said, is no apology for the privileged few. It is, in effect, a theory of the leisured class with a farcical illustration of the theory. But it is significant that Shaw should devote himself almost exclusively to the governors. In The Bolshevik Empress we hear of the majority that is generally half-forced and half-humbugged. We are assured, indirectly, that "some energetic and capable minority must always be in power." It is with the minority, scorned for being neither energetic nor capable, that Bernard Shaw occupies himself.

The preface to Heartbreak House is charmingly done. It is Shaw's first good outspoken talk since the war, and there is no talker like Shaw. Because it is talk, it lacks structure. Its ideas shimmer around the whole horizon of the world. The main effect, however, is to remind us that "Nature gave us a very long credit; and we abused it to the utmost. But when she struck at last she struck with a vengeance." And the people most to blame, of course, are the people of cultured, leisured Europe who had the reins in their hands. Shaw does not reject the war. "We were confronted with the necessity of destroying Prussia to prevent Prussia destroying us." But in touching war we defiled ourselves, and we may as well recognize the truth. He tells this truth in his preface with special reference to "the wicked half century" of his own life-time; and he points up in every possible comic way his judgment of the frivolous ruling class. We drifted to the abyss, he tells us, and when we fell into it we wallowed in it; and he leaves his version of the wallowing for the edification of the future. "And what will the future be?" He makes no prediction. Even if the Greatheart-Bolshevik pulls down our rotten civilization, it may be rebuilded by "Simple, Sloth and Presumption, by Feeble Mind and Much Afraid, and by all the jurymen of Vanity Fair."

Shaw makes no bones about having accepted the necessity of waging the war. "As for myself, why, it may be asked, did I not write two plays about the war instead of two pamphlets on it? The answer is significant. You cannot make war on war and on your neighbor at the same time . . . When men are heroically dying for their country, it is not the time to show their lovers and wives and fathers and mothers how they are being sacrificed to the blunders of boobies, the cupidity of capitalists, the ambition of conquerors, the electioneering of demagogues, the Pharisaism of patriots, the lusts and lies and rancors and bloodthirsts that love war because it opens their prison doors, and sets them in the thrones of power and popularity."

But why is it "not the time"? Why, if one considers war so evil, does one aid war while it is a real issue and condemn it when it becomes an ideal issue? Shaw answers, Necessity. "It was not easy for those who had to write and speak about the war to *throw away their highest conscience,* and deliberately work to a standard of inevitable evil instead of to the ideal of life more abundant. I can answer for at least one person who found the change from the wisdom of Jesus and St. Francis to the morals of Richard III. and the madness of Don Quixote extremely irksome. But *that change had to be made;* and we are all the worse for it, except those for whom it was not really a change at all, but only a relief from hypocrisy."

After thus defining war as "a horribly repugnant duty," Shaw hits hard at "war delirium," "general craziness," the U. S. A. where "war fever went beyond all sense and reason," "war maniacs," "the orgy," "barbarous ravings," "the obscene din," etc. "The big catastrophe was too big for them to grasp." "The war in its entire magnitude did not exist for the average citizen." "The natural confusion of ignorance was increased by a deliberately propagated confusion of nursery bogey stories and melodramatic nonsense." All this is very true, and worth saying, but does it alter the essential Vanity Fair attitude of Bernard Shaw himself?

"War," says Shaw, "puts a strain on human nature that breaks down the better half of it, and makes the worse half a diabolical virtue." That being the case, how can Shaw have stood for war? I had to throw away my higher, my highest, conscience, Shaw answers, to defeat Prussia. I had to change from the wisdom of Jesus to the morals of Richard III. For a disciple of John Bunyan, this is surely not a Greatheart speech. The essence of John Bunyan *is* a reckless obedience to the highest conscience. And the arguments against the highest conscience brought by Shaw in the case of war are precisely the arguments against the highest conscience brought by Heartbreak House and Horseback Hall in the case of everything that Shaw considers wicked. Everything wicked that the cultivated class does is admittedly deplorable and—necessary. Marriage for money, business for profit, exploitation of servants, romantic lies—all these things are promptly defended on Shaw's own lines.

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Yet, we are told, that greatest of all lies is this lie that we have no control over our conduct. Shaw is deeply indignant on the subject of pseudo-science. "For half a century before the war civilization had been going to the devil very precipitately under the influence of a pseudo-science as disastrous as the blackest Calvinism . . . In the middle of the nineteenth century naturalists and physicists assured the world, in the name of Science, that salvation and damnation are all nonsense, and that predestination is the central truth of religion, inasmuch as human beings are produced by their environment, their sins and good deeds being only a series of chemical and mechanical reactions over which they have no control." If this doctrine, this creed, is really so "imbecile and dangerous," how can Shaw plead necessity against his own highest conscience in the case of the recent war? This question is prompted by an uncomfortable sense that under the charm and glamour of Shaw's preface there is no radical consistency, no complete acceptance or yet complete rejection of either Greatheart or Wordly Wiseman. There is only a comedy that is dangerously full of sophism.

This is not to say that there is no dilemma. It is merely to say that Shaw's preface covers it up rather than clears it up.

Heartbreak House itself was written 1913-1916. It is an incoherent intellectual extravaganza at the expense of practically everyone except one wise old sea-captain, who may be taken as Shaw's spokesman. Shaw has not trammelled himself by trying to reproduce the atmosphere of the English country-house. He has given up the advantage of dramatizing an actual social set for the sake of collecting a greater variety of scalps, and into the wild Bohemian home of Captain Shotover he flings all sorts of romantic males and romantic females, and he makes music out of knocking their heads together. The young girl, who falls in love with "Marcus Darnley," discovers that this wonderful adventurer of hers is a lying married man, really named Hector Hushabye. Hector is a handsome devil but he bitterly complains that he is the lap-dog of his emotional wife. The young girl's disillusion breaks her heart. She turns from the dream of Hector to the cold suet-pudding reality of "Boss" Mangan, the capitalist. Mangan is an unattractive mortal—a man "standing a little on an entirely imaginary dignity, with a dull complexion, straight lustreless hair, and features so entirely commonplace that it is impossible to describe them." Long before it turns out that he is one of those "capitalists" who has no capital, he is kicked around by every visitor at Heartbreak House. Even Lady Utterwood and her bel ami and the old dreamer Mazzini Dunn show up the capitalist as despicable. And Captain Shotover does not approve of the young girl's calculating marriage to him. "I see my daughters," Lady Utterwood and Mrs. Hushabye, "and their men living foolish lives of romance and sentiment and snobbery. I see you, the younger generation, turning from their romance and sentiment and snobbery to money and comfort and hard common sense . . . At your age I looked for hardship, danger, honor, and death, that I might feel the life in me more intensely. I did not let the fear of death govern my life; and my reward was, I had my life. You are going to let the fear of poverty govern your life; and your reward will be that you will eat, but you will not live." To this heroic speech (Shaw's own romanticism, after all), the young girl answers, "I should like to marry you. Are you very rich?" But underneath she is saying, "O captain, O my captain."

It is at the ladies and the gentlemen, "the equestrian classes and the neurotic classes," that Shaw directs this play. His laughter at their expense is sometimes hilarious, sometimes crackling and mischievous, sometimes diabolic. On the whole, however, it is the desperate laughter of an aristocrat who cries, "Navigation. Learn it and live; or leave it and be damned." It is a cry to the governing class from a man who believes in minorities. Shaw is in this degree a conservative, he is mainly concerned in calling to Heartbreak House and Horseback Hall, "Repent, repent."

The play, as it seems to me, is not by any means fresh in its ideas, and in mechanism it is tiresomely fantastic. Shaw is of course a genius, and the caprices of genius are not to be patronized, but I saw less in the preface on the second reading than on the first, and a second reading of Heartbreak House is very hard work. On the stage, I have no doubt, the play will be funnier, physically more laughable. But the truth is, the great man is potting clay-pigeons in Heartbreak House—not shooting real game. O'Flaherty V. C., however, is one of the playlets which does not require the stage to be amusing. It is the simplest and best thing in the book. F. H.

Our Immortality

Our Immortality, by D. P. Rhodes. New York: The Macmillan Co.

IF any reader should be led by the title of Mr. Rhodes's books to expect a pious and edificatory discourse along the familiar lines of devotional literature, he will be a sadly disappointed man. He will find himself plunged, in Part I, into an argument on The Foundation of Knowledge which, by the compactness of its statement, the occasional eccentricities of its terminology, and the technical nature of its subject-matter, makes no easy reading even for a student of philosophy. He will, if he has the courage to persist, be led on, in Part II, into a discussion of The Meaning of Immortality, which has little more in common with current religious beliefs than the concept of "an unearthly existence" after death. Part III, lastly, which makes up two-thirds of the book, will introduce him to what Mr. Rhodes regards as The Practical Implications of a Rational View of Immortality.

The belief in immortality is for Mr. Rhodes not only common to all of us—it is bound up with the very instinct of self-preservation, the will to live—but a clear understanding of what immortality means is the one sure guide to right conduct and sound social institutions. The traditional scheme of reward in heaven and punishment in hell is a delusion. Death is not the door to eternity, but only one of many stepping-stones to perfection. Though the limits of our knowledge make any positive theory of the hereafter impossible, yet we can discern the direction to be taken by conduct and reform from the differentiation between man and lower animals. For in the lower animals, too, the "instinct of immortality" is present, exhibiting itself chiefly in their procreative and paternal impulses. They live not so much for the preservation of their private existences as for the perpetuation of life in others. Thus the instinct of immortality is one with altruism. This is even more true in man. No reasonable man can think that the few remaining years of his earthly existence are all that matters to him. They have value only through their bearing on posterity and on his own progress towards perfec-

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tion. But with man's advance in civilization has come sophistication. He has lost much of the sound judgment of lower animals in matters of life and death. "In men's killing, for example—in their use of the reproductive faculty, in their prolongation of spent or fruitless lives—is seen an erratic and ineffectual egoism for which no parallel can be found among the humbler denizens of the wild." Much of our altruism too has gone astray. We tend, for example, to think that, because life is short, every one must be given the best possible chance in this present existence on earth, though he may be notoriously unfit for happiness. Again we tend to think that "the eternal soul of each living man is a charge upon the public conscience," and thus make the mistake of assuming a direct responsibility for savage and semi-savage souls which are incapable of responding to the best influences of civilization. For Mr. Rhodes tendencies such as these are "products of skepticism and strained piety." On the other hand, under a more rational social system, built on a rational theory of immortality, we should prune the human stock by the killing of defective infants, and suicide would become the natural form of death. The commission of rape would be understood as pointing to an ancestry which has been starved in respect of sexual experience, and men of erotic tendencies would be segregated for experiments in eugenics. "The unruly and the licentious, far from being condemned to celibacy, would be encouraged and aided to marry although their choice would be subject to restrictions varying in accordance with the results obtained from earlier unions. Wives should easily be found if no ignominy were associated with the state of segregation and no hardship more serious than the absence of many traditional opportunities for violence and deceit and for striving for the unattainable."

Homicidal maniacs would be dealt with similarly by preventive segregation, and the legal murder of murderers would become unnecessary. Prohibition of the use of alcohol and of drugs would be abolished, "for, in order to eliminate the most anomalous type of man and to preserve and improve the most promising type, it is undoubtedly important that no adult of either sex should be suffered either to regard as forbidden any practice entailing no certain detriment to others, or to reckon upon the restraining hand of society in case this addiction to the practice should prove detrimental to himself."

War will not disappear until the human race ceases to be composed of separate and independent tribes, and tribal divisions will not cease "as long as the right of property and the factitious authority of one man over others are sustained in custom." Hence a League of Nations does not cut at the root of the trouble. Of property we read that "in proportion as a man has a thing to himself, his enjoyment of it is slight," and that our present system of production under the law of supply and demand is "organized waste." Mr. Rhodes suggests that ultimately property will come to be acquired only for immediate use, not for ownership without use, nor with power of bequest to any persons, or for any purposes, which the individual may select. The provision of the necessaries of life will be equal and automatic for all, but, beyond this, standards of life will continue to vary in proportion to efficiency in altruism, especially in the arts and sciences. "Many will still dine on bread and beef and beer to whom caviar and champagne are denied. Many will inhabit commonplace dwellings while others are surrounded with treasures enabling them to add to the world's store of admirable handiwork and stimulating ideas."

Of government it is said that "it is manifestly unsuitable that one man should have a semblance of authority over another"; that "politics as a career will be struck off the list of human vocations"; that eventually mankind "will be governed not by individuals but by a code that will have been subscribed to by every individual showing a tolerable competence for any productive vocation."

From these samples the reader can judge for himself what he may expect from Mr. Rhodes in the way of social reform. Mr. Rhodes is clearly a man of ideas. He writes as one having a grave and urgent message for his generation. Yet he expresses his thoughts in a way in which they are almost sure to fall on deaf ears. Though some will sympathize with his attacks on sentimental humanitarianism, the average practical man will probably set him down as a crank. Philosophers will wish that the theories of knowledge and of reality which provide the setting for his theory of immortality, had been far more fully and lucidly elaborated. To take but one point: Mr. Rhodes clearly believes that the experiences of one's ancestors determine what sort of man one is in this life, and that one's own behaviour and experiences determine the inheritance of one's descendants. At the same time, the individual also takes his experiences with him into his unearthly future and continues and indeed perfects them, there. The relation of the earthly to the unearthly series of experiences is far from clear, and there seems lacking a proper concept of individuality. It would have been helpful if Mr. Rhodes had indicated the relation of his theory to Weismann's theory of an immortal germ-plasm, or to Samuel Butler's theory of the identity of successive generations.

Again, most of Mr. Rhodes's actual proposals seem to be based upon a purely biological and eugenic point of view, and their connection with his doctrine of immortality appears more or less fanciful. Last, but not least, the calculated detachment of Mr. Rhodes's utterances is sure to rob them of an extensive hearing. No other thinker past or present is so much as mentioned. Plowing his lonely furrow, Mr. Rhodes seems to forget that social reform is a common concern and requires cooperative thinking and a pooling of wisdom. For a man with a message it is even more important to be social than to be right. If he avoid contacts, he condemns himself to impotence. Mr. Rhodes must not expect to move the world by talking to himself in a corner.

R. F. A. H.

Frederick the Great

The Life of Frederick the Great, by Norwood Young. New York: Henry Holt & Co.

SINCE Ranke published his Nine Books of Prussian History in 1847-48, German scholars have given much attention to Frederick the Great. Mr. Young, following the least biassed of the Germans, such as Lehmann, and making independent use of Koser's edition of the Politische Korrespondenz and of the elaborate military histories published by the German and Austrian General Staffs, has given us a brief life in which the traditional hero is sadly diminished. If Frederick is still permitted the title "Great," it is solely because the title has commonly been confined to rulers who increased their domains by conquest. In no other sense, according to Mr. Young, was Frederick great. On the contrary, Mr. Young makes him out to be a small man really—of mean spirit, of despicable instincts, of mediocre intelligence, a cruel man devoid of generous sentiments and of moral principles, concerned only for his own glory, wholly indifferent to the welfare of others, even of his own people. "Maria Theresa used to

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"was so active a person—not to say so noisy and conspicuous; he so occupied the centre of every stage, that, when he died, it was as though a wind had fallen, a light had gone out, a military band had stopped playing. It was not so much the death of an individual as a general lowering in the vitality of the nation. America was less America, because he was no longer here. He should have lived twenty years more had he been willing to go slow, to loaf and invite his soul, to feed that mind of his in a wise passiveness. But there was no repose about him, and his pleasures were as strenuous as his toils."

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speak of Frederick as ein böser Mann. He was more; he was not merely mischievous and dangerous; he was what we call 'a bad man'." These words, with which Mr. Young closes, might be taken as the thesis which his book is designed to demonstrate.

Frederick was a bad man if you like; he probably does not deserve the military reputation which he has enjoyed; whether he was a great statesman depends upon your definition of a statesman. As an antidote to Carlyle and the German makers of Legendary Prussian heroes, Mr. Young's book doubtless has a certain value. Otherwise there is little to be said for it. Mr. Young writes clearly indeed, but without force or charm; and while he is generally accurate in the statement of particular facts (note, however, the error in respect to the Treaty of Versailles of May 1, 1757), his book on the whole conveys a false, or at least a quite inadequate, idea of the eighteenth century and of Frederick's place in it. One might suppose that the international politics of the century turned upon the efforts of amiable and honorable governments to protect themselves against the ruthless aggression of Prussia. What we chiefly learn about Frederick are the innumerable instances in which he exhibited himself as a bad man. This is to reduce history and biography to their lowest terms; history becomes a struggle between good and bad powers, while biography is mainly a matter of noting good and bad actions. If only Frederick had, by virtue of his "badness," miserably failed, the story of his life on these lines should properly be in all the Sunday-school libraries.

Mr. Young is so occupied with the task of belittling Frederick that he often gives us far-fetched reasons for conduct susceptible of simple explanation. Thus he thinks the Anti-Machiavel was written in order to deceive contemporaries as to the policy he intended to follow when he became king. But if this were so why, as soon as he became king, on the eve of the Silesian war when if ever such deception would be useful, did Frederick write to Voltaire: "For the love of God buy up the whole edition of the Anti-Machiavel." It is more reasonable to suppose that the Anti-Machiavel, written at the age of twenty-seven, was a sophomiric exercise natural enough to one whose head was filled with the fine sentiments properly to be expected from a disciple of the French Philosophes. Upon assuming the responsibilities of government, the thing would be likely to strike him for what it was—sentimental rubbish. To conceal his Real Politik behind a mask of virtuous phrases was in fact much less characteristic of Frederick than of most statesmen of his time. The main difference between Frederick and the others was that he was more frank in avowing his real motives. "I take in the first place," he said. "There will always be professors enough to justify what I do." The elder Pitt of course never said anything remotely resembling this. It is true, he took a good deal here and there; but he had the valuable political talent for convincing himself that the extension of the British empire was agreeable to God and a service to humanity. For one, I find Frederick more refreshing at least than either the elder Pitt or Kaiser Wilhelm II precisely because he left God out of a bad business.

The biographer of Frederick needs a lively feeling for what may be called the 18th century mentality, and above all a marked aptitude for penetrating to the secret springs of a warped and twisted personality. Nothing is more important surely for understanding Frederick's cynical soul than the treatment he received at the hands of his brutal father. Mr. Young does indeed relate this treatment at some length, but apparently for the purpose of showing up Frederick William rather than for explaining the crooked mind of his son. It is therefore no help to him when he comes to deal, for example, with such an episode as the relations of Frederick and Voltaire, with the result that the whole business strikes the reader as fantastic beyond belief. To the modern mind it must indeed seem incredible that two high-placed and distinguished men could have descended to the meannesses of which they were both guilty; still more incredible that, having enlivened Europe with mutual insults which would have humiliated a blackguard, they should nevertheless have continued a friendly correspondence for many years after. To read this riddle we must remember that the 18th century was far more hospitable to the *ruse,* the "practical joke," than we are. Horace Walpole, an honorable man surely, was not above writing a letter to Rousseau to which he signed the name of Frederick. The forgery was published, to the great amusement of the initiated in Paris and London. Hume, then introducing Rousseau to London, allowed his friend to suppose the letter genuine, and meantime resorted to various devices to open Rousseau's own correspondence. The joke, you perceive, was on Rousseau. The point is that contemporaries would not have understood Mr. Young's disgust at the tricks by which Voltaire and Frederick amused themselves and Europe generally. If Voltaire was not as much amused as Frederick it was because he was in a position to get the worst of it; and among the advantages of Frederick was this, that he was especially fitted, by brutal treatment in his youth, to inflict and to endure with considerable relish blows which would blast a sensitive soul. His comment, on one occasion when Voltaire resented some peculiarly odious betrayal, is illuminating. "Voltaire has discovered, I know not how, *the little treason we practised upon him,* and he is extremely offended; *he will recover, I hope.*"

The 18th century in general, and Frederick in particular, enjoyed these harmless "jokes." If the victim took offense, the most one could hope for was that he would recover. Rousseau was one of the few who never did. But there is no possibility of understanding Frederick, or Voltaire, if they are to be judged by the instincts and reticences in such matters that one might properly attribute to Mr. Balfour or President Wilson. If Mr. Young's Frederick is mostly an enigma, when it is not a carricature, it is due largely to the fact that he judges a man whom he neither likes nor understands by standards that were foreign to the age in which he lived. C. B.

Contributors

to this issue

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